Surplus Rebellion, Human Capital, and the Ends of Study in Chile, 2011

Bret Leraul
Cornell University

“Ese punto de la ciudad donde las estadísticas no llegan”

In June 2011, as the protests of Chilean students became a truly mass mobilization, the announcement by President Sebastián Piñera (2010-14) of the Gran Acuerdo Nacional de la Educación (GANE) and his government’s repeated calls for dialogue fell on deaf ears. July saw the retrenchment of both sides. Tens and hundreds of thousands of protestors answered calls by student leaders for more demonstrations while others fortified the barricades at the more than six hundred universities and secondary schools already occupied. On the other side, the police took recourse to increasingly repressive crowd control tactics as government ministers continued their media assault, hoping to sway the stubbornly favorable public opinion of the movement. By August 2011, the confrontation between police and protesters had reached such a fevered pitch that the situation seemed poised to devolve into chaos.

1 I would like to acknowledge Bruno Bosteels, Tom McEnaney, Paul Fleming, and the anonymous reviewer at A contracorriente for their input in drafting this article, as well as Gavin Arnall and Alessandro Fornazzari for the chance to present some of its thinking in the seminar they organized at the 2016 meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association. I would especially like to thank Eloísa Paz Sierralta Landaeta for the generous conversation one hazy Santiago afternoon in 2013 that sparked the line of inquiry of which this article is one result.
In the weeks before the fatal shooting by police of sixteen-year-old Manuel Gutiérrez on the night of August 26, 2011, an anonymous anti-manifesto began to circulate on the internet and on pamphlets at marches. The pamphlet is addressed to students and their leaders, and it sparked considerable debate on social media within the student ranks. Although its provenance has been hotly debated, “En defensa de la capucha” is symptomatic of a crisis of representation within a movement itself predicated on a crisis of representation coursing through Chile’s nascent post-Transition.

Si tapo mi cara con un trapo no es por miedo, es por vergüenza. Y no a mi piedra, sino a tu amenaza. Esa que evita el diálogo, a ese ultimátum que sin querer nos dijiste “Se acabó el tiempo de las marchas” ¿bajo qué autoridad detienes el tiempo de la historia? Es cierto, no soy estudiante. Soy un infiltrado en esta marcha, no pertenezco a sus distinguidos planteles. Soy el desecho de este “orden”, soy flaite y de los duros (literalmente). No intentes explicarme. A golpes me educaron y a golpes pretendo enseñarte. No conozco otra vía [...] Y no crean que pertenezco a grupos organizados [...] Ni siquiera conozco la palabra ideología, no me interesa ser el objeto de análisis de los sociólogos. Soy flaite y punto. [...] Para ustedes, la toma es una anécdota. Para mi familia fue la forma de ganarse un terreno. A ustedes los disuelven con lacrimógenas, a nosotros con balas. No en el centro, claro, sino en la periferia, en ese punto de la ciudad donde las estadísticas no llegan. [...] Así que no intentes controlarme, ni por la razón ni por la fuerza. Soy el antilema. [...] Soy la cara oculta, la capucha.

In the national imagination, the encapuchados came to figure the vandalism and pitched battles with police that followed in the wake of the more than 6,000 demonstrations that rocked the country in 2011 (Koschützke 17). They came to bear all the weight of illegitimate violence and were equally repudiated by the government and the student federations, engaged as they were in a fierce media battle over public opinion. While there were debates over the use of violent means for political ends between student federation bureaucracies and certain sectors of the militant student base—in particular secondary school activists organized around the CONES and the

---

2 Crónica de un comité (2014), a documentary film by José Luis Sepúlveda and Carolina Adriazola, follows the family of Manuel Gutiérrez on their quest for justice in the aftermath of his death. This unvarnished look into the family’s attempt to prosecute the officer involved in the shooting poignantly contrasts the mother’s religious resentment with his brother’s desire to politicize Manuel’s death. In this, it complicates the crisis of representational politics that this article details.

3 La Transición refers to the transition to democracy that began with the 1988 national referendum against extending Augusto Pinochet’s rule until 1997. This period has come to be associated with La Concertación, the center-left coalition of political parties that ruled until the 2010 election of Sebastián Piñera from the non-pacted party Renovación Nacional (RN). Piñera’s election and the 2011 student movement are generally seen as the start of the post-Transition.
ACES\(^4\) (Figueroa 106)—in the media, student leaders in their representative capacity largely rejected the *encapuchados* and their ‘tactics’ (Figueroa 102-3; Jackson 68-70, 82-84; Vallejo 31-33). From the perspective of the student leadership, violent repression of pacific marchers by the police could be leveraged to delegitimize the government’s position. Like so many movements based on acts of civil disobedience, Chile’s 2011 mobilization politicized violence, just not their own. By contrast, the anonymous author of “En defensa de la capucha” rejects political readings of the *encapuchados* and their behavior. Occupation is not a political tool but a means of survival. Violence is not extraordinary but a fact of everyday life in the poor and policed peripheries of cities across the country. Its eruption during marches marks only its displacement from margin to center.

“En defensa de la capucha” gives voice to a crisis of political representation within the student movement, a crisis exacerbated by the decision of its most prominent leaders to seek election to Chile’s Chamber of Deputies in 2013.\(^5\) The *encapuchado* does not partake in organized politics. As the text declares, “no crean que pertenezco a grupos organizados [...] Ni siquiera conozco la palabra ideología” (“Defensa”). The *encapuchado* is a liminal, collective figure that bursts into the instituted politics of student leaders and politicians played out in the Chilean media, threatening the glass house of legitimated discourse with a barrage of stones. In this

---

\(^4\) La Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES) is the federation of secondary students in Santiago founded in 2001 at the final congress of its predecessor organization (Historia Aces). It was the primary organization behind the 2006 student protests known as the Revolución Pingüina that began the current protest cycle. La Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios (CONES) was founded in 2011 to respond to the perceived need for national coordination among organized secondary students, just as the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH) provided an institutional space for coordination among university federations at the national level.

\(^5\) Camila Vallejo, president of the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh) (2010-2011) and the official movement’s principal spokeswoman, campaigned as a member of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), which would go on to form part of the coalition government of Michelle Bachelet’s second term in office, La Nueva Mayoría; Vallejo won her bid to represent the Santiago community of La Florida. Francisco Figueroa, two-term vice president of the FECh (2009-2011), ran under the banner of the non-pacted Izquierda Autónoma (IA), but lost his bid to represent Santiago’s Núñoa district. Giorgio Jackson, president of the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica (FEUC) (2010-2011), won his bid to represent Santiago Centro as a candidate for Revolución Democrática, the political party he and several other student activists formed in 2012. Gabriel Boric, successor to Vallejo as president of the FECh (2011-12) and, until recently, a colleague of Figueroa in the ranks of IA and on the board of directors of its associated foundation, Nodo XXI, ultimately won election to represent Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic. And Karol Cariola, former president of the Federación de Estudiantes de La Universidad de Concepción (FEC) (2009-2010) and Secretary General of the Juventudes Comunistas (JJ.CC.) since 2011, was elected as a member of the PCCh to represent the Santiago communities of Recoleta and Independencia.
sense, it figures not only a crisis of political representation within the movement. The *encapuchado* also affects a parallel crisis of discursive representation. Indeed, its speech in the “Defensa” is already a breach of the tacit contract between constituted and legitimated identities that condemns the constituent mass to the silence of the real and the supposed senselessness of the violent act.

In this article, I trace this double crisis of representation largely disavowed by the representations and representatives of Chile’s 2011 movement. I suggest that the *encapuchado* of the “Defensa” does not so much reject politics tout court but specifically rejects the politics of recognition, representation, and demand practiced by the student federations and the government. In addition to the figure of the *encapuchado*, I will conjure its foil, the figure of the student. On the one hand, I claim that the student movement constitutes itself through the exclusion of the *encapuchado*, whose appearance constitutes a representational crisis within its ranks. On the other hand, I claim that the figure of the student is also in crisis, as it comes to buckle under the weight of successive figurations in the national imagination parallel to evolving modes of capitalist capture and command: first, as subjected subject of educational apparatuses, then, as human capital investor, and, finally, as student-debtor. I will conclude by suggesting how a notion of work no longer indexed to any productive or reproductive function for capital, a notion I call *study-without-end*, subtends the differential constitution of these two collective figures in the 2011 movement.

My interest in reading the *encapuchado* and the student as figures captured and produced by representational regimes—mine among them—is to transcode them into a form conducive to a mode of cultural criticism that offers an alternative to the journalistic and sociological approaches that have dominated the discursive reception and construction of 2011. My hope is that this act of mediation will allow me to

---

6 Chile’s crisis has occasioned an astonishing surge in publications by educational sociologists. To take but one example, José Joaquín Brunner, Chile’s seemingly ubiquitous higher education expert, has co-authored or co-edited four tomes with the publishing house of the Universidad Diego Portales in the years since the 2006 secondary student movement: see, Brunner, Brunner and Uribe, Brunner and Peña, Brunner and Villalobos. Of course, the work of sociologists should not be discounted. Much of this article is informed by their research, even as it seeks to return their findings to the political crucible from which they have been abstracted and formalized. However, to move away from sociology need not return us to the philosophical debates about the ‘Idea of the University’ that have accompanied the institution from its modern refounding (e.g. Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, W. von Humboldt) to its contemporary crises (e.g. F. Lyotard, J. Derrida, B. Readings). In Chile, discourse around the Idea of the University has a history as long as the institution itself, beginning with Andrés Bello’s “Discurso inaugural de la Universidad de Chile” (1842). Its most important contemporary iteration is Willy Thayer’s *La crisis no moderna de la universidad moderna* (1996), a work that has spawned a host of largely Derridean elaborations by Chilean and Latin
overcome the fragmentation and alienation of the social texts I analyze by weaving a
critical narrative whose red thread runs diagonally through contemporary Chile’s
economic, political, and social conjuncture (Jameson 25). This narrative transcoding
also dislocates the events of 2011 by interrogating the easy and unexamined
assignation of words to things, voices to bodies that doubly excludes the movement’s
radical, anonymous elements, first, within the representational politics of the
movement’s liberal reformism and, then, within the nascent archive of the year. My
focus on figures works toward this end; for figures, in the rhetorical sense, connote a
troubling of referentiality. In this rhetorical sense, the figure allows me to approximate
the anonymity of the encapuchados and the futurity of students and to conjecture about
their common dispossession. Ultimately, the figure is a heuristic device that enables a
materialist re-analysis of the historical narrative. This method of ‘figural mediation’
aims to reconfigure the archive of 2011 in order to release its radical potential from
the obfuscating historical narratives and policy solutions tendered by the alliance of its
dominant academic reception and Chile’s elitist, neoliberal democracy. As Michelle
Bachelet’s coalition, Nueva Mayoría, steamrolls educational reform through the
congress, such a reconfigured archive is urgently needed in order to understand why
in 2016—five years since 2011 and a decade since the outbreak of student unrest—
Chilean people continue to defy the state.

El Encapuchado: Amphibious, Anonymous

Not a student, not organized, not political, the encapuchado of the “Defensa”
would seem to be a purely negative or reactive counter-identity recognizable only by
its violence. But this would be a double oversight. First, the encapuchado is not an
identity but an anonymous virtuality. Secondly, the text’s anonymous author not only
claims to act as an encapuchado—act, for the figure is its action, not only violence but
also hooding. The author also twice declares, “Soy flaite.” Flaite is a moniker
commonly used to describe low-class, urban youth and associated cultural markers in
behavior (drug use, petty crime, blowhard confidence), appearance (faux brand-name
sneakers, bowl or mullet haircuts, tattoos), and speech (a distinctly lower class, youth
sociolect). Despite the mobility of those cultural markers, flaite is a term delimited by

American(ist) theorists. An emerging trend known in the Anglo-American academy as Critical
University Studies (e.g. Jeff Williams, Marc Bousquet, Chris Newfield, Morgan Adamson, Fred
Moten and Stefano Harney) tries to chart a path between depoliticized empiricism and
philosophical speculation guided by a historical materialist firmament. This article attempts to
do the same.
socio-economic class. By calling the *encapuchado flaite*, “Defensa de la capucha” highlights the latent, even repressed, class character of the figure of the student and its movement, a point to which we will return. By placing a liminal class identity behind the *encapuchado’s* mask, the “Defensa” does not actualize the virtuality held up by the anonymity of the latter. Rather, I will argue that the “Defensa” composes an amphibious figure, the *encapuchado-flaite*, that operates at once within and in excess of representational regimes and the politics of recognition. In order to illuminate this amphibiousness, we will need to shift our frame of analysis away from the representation of constituted identities and toward the material conditions of their constituent practices.

Even as the *encapuchado* of the “Defensa” refuses identification, the positive identity *flaite* limns class-consciousness as an underclass or declassed collectivity. As such, the *encapuchado-flaite* would join a cast—or caste—of unclassifiable subjectivities including neo-Gramscianism’s subaltern, post-Fordist theorists’ ambiguous multitude, and Marx’s lumpenproletariat. Like the lumpenproletariat of the *18th Brumaire* or the negative face of the amphibious multitude in Paolo Virno’s work, the *encapuchado-flaite* of the “Defensa” can be seen to coincide with many of the positions of Chile’s political and economic elite.

Before stepping down in mid-July 2011, then Minister of Education Joaquín Lavín gave an interview to reporters from *La Tercera*, Chile’s left-of-center daily, that exemplifies the government’s discursive tactics against the student movement. Lavín panders to parents and students concerned about “missing the semester” (by October, the government would be forced to speak of missing the school year); he undermines the legitimacy of student protestors and their leaders by claiming that they do not represent the majority of students, and that the supposedly ultra-leftist politics of their leaders is out of step with the general populace (“Yo creo que los dirigentes se politizaron, pero la ciudadanía no” [Capochnik and Villalobos]); and he incites fear that these leaders cannot control the mob. Lavín’s message is clear: only the government and its police are capable of maintaining order; only the government can determine which goals are legitimate and realistic, a claim captured by the Transition’s catch phrase “en la medida de lo posible”; and only through dialogue and demobilization can order, legitimacy and everyday normalcy be restored. “Siempre he estado dispuesto a conversar los temas que realmente están relacionados con la educación. Lo que no se puede hacer es mezclar las legítimas demandas con exigencias políticas e ideológicas” (Capochnik and Villalobos).
As this example makes clear, for Lavín and Chile’s political elite, governance and education function best when unencumbered by politics or ideology. In spite of his position in the cabinet of the first right-wing government since the end of the dictatorship, the political playbook is the same as that of the Concertación: Lavín incites fear of a return to the upheavals of the seventies. According to the official story, the political and ideological polarization of Chilean society, on both the left and right, brought about the election of Salvador Allende and his Unidad Popular and the conservative reaction, first as gremialismo and, then, as dictatorship. The encapuchado-flaite of the “Defensa” who self-designates as apolitical and non-ideological could be seen as the illegitimate ideal of contemporary Chilean citizenship. Until the student movement, many believed that Chilean youth in general were equally depoliticized. If politics and ideology distinguish the student protestors from Chile’s dominant governing, purportedly apolitical violence distinguishes the encapuchado-flaite from both. Despite the apolitical posturing of “En defensa de la capucha”, there is no human activity that does not also partake of the political, even if it eschews traditional politics. In this light, the threat of this figure may be posed differently. Just as the encapuchado infiltrates officially sanctioned student demonstrations, its minor politics may come to infiltrate the grand politics practiced by the government and the movement’s leaders.

Masked protestors are not a phenomenon unique to Chile. Therefore, we must carefully distinguish the encapuchado from other groups employing similar tactics. Beginning with anarchists in the German antinuclear movement in the 1980s, tactical anonymity gained prominence with the anti-globalization protests that straddled the turn of the century. Today, masked protestors willing to exercise force have become fixtures of protest movements around the world. But Chile’s 2011 movement rarely figures in surveys of the new protest culture, even though it garnered enough international media attention that readers of The Guardian (UK) selected Camila Vallejo as person of the year. This is not only, as I have already claimed, because its non-violent, reformist face obscures its insurrectionary mask but also, as the “Defensa” makes clear, because Chile’s encapuchados reject any ideological ascription. Vallejo, too, cites political intention as distinguishing anarchists from the encapuchados.

7 For an overview of the increasing salience of anonymity as a tool of political resistance since the 1990s, see Bordeleau (9-34).
despite the similarities of their tactics and appearance at marches.\(^8\) Writing about the violent, masked protagonists of Mexico’s 2013 student protests, historian Carlos Illades, distinguishes between classical anarchism and “los rebeldes posmodernos,” whose ‘neoanarachism’ he denounces as “nihilista en la medida en que carece de fines y supone una fractura de la historicidad” (430).\(^9\) Even anarchist anthropologist David Graeber emphasizes the organization and planning involved in direct actions performed by contemporary anarchist groups. If we take the “Defensa” at its word, the encapuchado is not anarchist, nihilist, or postmodern, and its violence cannot be justified in political terms, where politics is understood as self-conscious and intentional. Instead, I want to suggest, we should think of the encapuchado less as a protestor and more as a rioter.

Joshua Clover’s *Riot. Strike, Riot.* (2016) makes strides toward constructing a materialist theory of riot, one that I believe sheds light on Chile’s 2011 cycle, despite its focus on what he calls the ‘overdeveloped’ world. Clover’s analysis of the leading forms of collective action against capitalism restores to contemporary riot the political significance its relational difference to strike has obscured.\(^10\) It also helps us to understand the amphibiousness of the encapuchado-flaite and to anticipate its homology with the figure of the student. In Clover’s typology, strikes are worker struggles in the realm of production over the value of labor-power; riots are consumer struggles in the realm of consumption and circulation over the price of goods (16). Both are struggles for the reproduction of living labor (46). Clover bookends industrial strike actions with pre-industrial and post-industrial forms of riot to form the sequence ‘riot–strike–riot prime’ parallel to Marx’s classic formulation M–C–M’. Pre-industrial riot, then, entails what E.P. Thompson called “price-setting”, specifically setting the price of goods at zero through looting (15). Like pre-industrial riot, post-industrial riot remains a circulation struggle. But its dominant aspect is less price-setting in the marketplace, for under its financial aspect the marketplace has been volatilized and

---

8 Anarchists have long formed a key bloc in Chile’s student federations and particularly the FECh since its founding in the early twentieth century. For a brief history of anarchism among Chilean university students in the first decades of the twentieth century, see Craib.

9 Illades closely parallels Murray Bookchin’s now classic “Social anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism,” down to the characterization of their respective targets as nihilist and postmodern.

10 A combination of Clover’s regional focus and strident historical materialism may explain his silence about civil society movements and their forms of protest. Although widespread and ideologically capacious in Latin America and Latin American Studies, in radical circles in the US, civil society movements have come to be seen as complicit with liberalism.
thereby insulated from such popular price-setting, and more those surplus populations excluded within capitalism from waged labor, who must seek their reproduction in circulation, a fate they share with the post-industrial economy at large.

Of course, we must be wary when translating Clover’s theory of riot from its North Atlantic context. Despite the apparently ill fit of Clover’s stagism to Chile’s uneven development, the wholesale importation of Chicago School economics beginning in 1957 affords some grounds for comparison. A country where the authoritarian state violently mercantilized society by replacing import-substitution industrialization with financialization and extractivism presents a context in many ways homologous to that of Clover’s post-industrial overdeveloped world. Chilean populations rendered surplus to production must seek their reproduction in circulation, quite literally, as they shuffle between subcontracted gigs and credit cards or as entrepreneurs of the self in an economy whose lax labor laws, cowed trade unions, and minimal government regulation have rendered the formal economy effectively informal.

Understanding contemporary riot as a rebellion of surplus populations sheds light on the figure of the encapuchado-flaite. Indeed, in the “Defensa”, it calls itself “el desecho de este orden” and its activity resembles the riots Clover has in mind. Similarly, the liminal class identity flaite can be understood as pertaining to a population marginal to traditional forms of waged labor. And its non-ideological posturing and self-designation as “anti lema” squares with Clover’s claim that “the politics of surplus populations [are] politics without program” (181), so that the encapuchado-flaite does not eschew politics altogether, but only what I have called the politics of representation, recognition, and demand.

The category of surplus population also allows us to think together the encapuchado-flaite and the student. In his analysis of Occupy Oakland, Clover references the ‘double riot’ in which youth—“the holders of promissory notes”—and surplus populations—“the holders of nothing at all”—recognize their common dispossession (180). This pairing is commonly misrecognized as opposition, “the abjection of one betraying the relative privilege of the other”, a point borne out by the mutual

11 One could make the case for a regional overdetermination of effects that would clear the ground for comparison. Globally speaking, then, we might say that the homology of pre-industrial riot and post-industrial ‘riot prime’, the residual persistence of different tactics beneath the leading tactics of different conjunctures, and the “interregnum […] and uneasy suspension” (Clover 24) of the epochal transition from production to circulation, industrial to finance capital, give a host of different economies—non-industrial, pseudo-industrial, and post-industrial alike—the appearance of uneven and combined development.
antagonism of Chile’s student leaders and the author(s) of the “Defensa” (180). Unlike the ‘68 uprisings in Mexico, France, or Italy, where university students and workers joined in solidarity by virtue of their shared productivism, so long as students today continue to see themselves as future producers, they will fail to recognize their solidarity with surplus populations and vice versa. In the 2011 movement, only secondary school students demonstrated affinities with the encapuchados and their riotous tactics, for reasons I will detail below.

I have suggested that “En defensa de la capucha” discursively represents a crisis of political representation among student federation bureaucracies, militant student bases, and other social actors. But to say the text represents a crisis privileges etiologies of representation and recognition that it wants to refute. Instead—or in addition—we could read the text as a manifesto that performatively affects a representational crisis beginning with its anonymous authorship. Like the encapuchado’s masked face, the author’s anonymity is essential to the text’s mode of resistance. The refusal to be named or to name oneself frustrates the regime of identification on which the moral economy of traditional Western subject formation rests.

For evidence of this in the Chilean context, we may look at President Michelle Bachelet’s 2006 inaugural address to the Chamber of Deputies, in which she criticizes recent protests by high school students that would grow into the so-called Revolución Pingüina, the immediate forerunner of the 2011 cycle.

Quiero ciudadanos críticos [...] Pero esa crítica debe hacerse con un espíritu constructivo, con propuestas sobre la mesa y, lo más importante, a cara descubierta y sin violencia. Quiero ser muy clara: Lo que hemos visto en semanas recientes e inaceptable. ¡No toleraré el vandalismo, ni los detsrozos, ni la intimidación a las personas! Aplicaré todo el rigor de la ley. La democracia la ganamos con la cara descubierta. (Bachelet)

Bachelet is clear, not only in threatening protestors with legally sanctioned state violence, but also in articulating the regime of identification that undergirds the democratic legitimation of that state apparatus. “Critical citizens” must pacifically direct their demands to the government, but, “most importantly,” they must do so “bare-faced.” While the logic of this passage turns on a legitimist understanding of violence that has become common sense under capitalist democracies (Graeber 448-49), it concludes with pathos by invoking the struggle for democracy in the 1980s12.

---

12 Graeber borrows Australian political philosopher Tony Coady’s useful typology, which identifies restrictive, wide and legitimist definitions of violence. The legitimist definition understands violence as “harm or damage to either persons or property that is not authorized
The moral insinuation is that democracy is a public, transparent endeavor, and therefore anonymity is antidemocratic. Although they differ in rhetorical mode, the proximity of the two claims suggests that the threat to legitimately exercise state violence against protesters’ ‘violence’ may also apply to their anonymity. Indeed, in July 2016, the Chamber of Deputies decided to consider a law that would criminalize masked protest.

In the case of “Defensa de la capucha,” its author or authors become anonymous by the simple non-disclosure or absence of the name, for in a text, identity and the name are coextensive. The encapuchado, on the other hand, is a living presence already disclosed to the world. It becomes anonymous through masking, a kind of doubling or surfeit of identity that dissimulates an individual, personal identity in exchange for a collective, depersonalized one. In this sense, the encapuchado’s masking carries to an extreme the same substitution of individual for collective identity at work in any mass movement or collective action. But where the individual in the mass is anonymous only as a part of that collective body, the masked individual remains anonymous as a single actor. The mass composed of identifiable individuals participates in and seeks to appropriate the regimes of visibility, identification, presence, and representation—the mass march is largely a spectacle, after all. The anonymous mass composed of masked actors asserts a dispersed and articulated collective identity capable of infiltrating the visible, identifiable mass and of acting in plain sight below the radar of representational capture. In 2011, not only the encapuchados took recourse to collective anonymity; riot police, too, removed or obscured their last names on their uniforms, the better to act with impunity on behalf of the state. Both the encapuchados and the police understand that unnamed power recedes into potentiality, unnamed presence into virtuality, the unnamed and unidentifiable individual into a mass of bodies or the machinery of state.

by properly constituted authorities” (448). As Graeber points out, this definition, favored by political conservatives, makes state violence impossible, unless the state is not “properly constituted.”

13 Jennifer B. Spiegel makes a similar point in her recent article about the use of anonymity and performative protest in the Quebec student strikes, a movement that was in solidarity with the contemporaneous Chilean student movement. Based on her reading of Norma Claire Moruzzi and Hannah Arendt, she reminds us that the Roman juridical concept of persona derives from the masks worn in ancient Greek theater. In this context, the mask constituted the “public face and role through which a voice could be heard” which for Arendt is a political voice because it obscures the vulnerability of the body (796). The mask obscures a private identity and an individual body behind a public persona. I would add that the same suspension of private, individual identity occurs in the mass, or populace, or people, such that the individual public persona is always residually collective.
With regard to the “Defensa” as a text, I must add that to write anonymously obscures the point of contact between discursive production and concrete existence, namely, authorship. As a result, the anonymous text compels an immanent reading, or as the activist hacker collective Anonymous puts it in its manifesto, “We take away the face and leave only the message. Behind the mask we could be anyone, which is why we are judged by what we say and do, not who we are or what we have” (“We Are Anonymous”). As anonymity returns the reader to the text’s message, so it returns the figure of the encapuchado to an action any individual could potentially perform. In this resides my understanding of virtuality as a kind of inversion of representation. At its most basic level, representation designates one presence standing in another presence. Virtuality, however, need not represent a presence. The anonymous encapuchado does not say, “I stand in place of this one or any one.” Rather it says, “Any one could stand in my place” or, as David Graeber states, describing black bloc tactics, “Any act done by any of us might as well have been done by me” (407). The encapuchado’s virtuality upsets the priorities of a politics of representation and recognition—in short, identity politics—by revalorizing activity as the human capacity for conscious world-making and self-fashioning, by returning us to what the young Marx called our species being (75-77).

Nonetheless, readers of the “Defensa” seem compelled to tether the enunciating subject to a subject of experience, to make a body the cause of a voice, the voice an expression of concrete life, as if their coincidence were the adequation of some truth. Calling on Beatriz Sarlo’s critique of what she calls “the subjective turn,” we may also say that by dissimulating the flaite as a subject who suffers poverty and violence, the “Defensa” forfeits the “moral hegemony” that guarantees the referential truth of its representation of those experiences (47, 57).14 Both raise doubts about the text’s provenance—that is, its referential truth—doubts that see the impeccable grammar and orthography, elevated register, and mentions of ‘ideology’, ‘sociology,’ and ‘statistics’ as uncharacteristic of the subject-supposed-to-be-flaite (Jackson 82). Since the encapuchado admits no positive identification, the anonymous author must be flaite, as if identity alone granted license to speak. Such doubts only reflect the readers’ prejudices, setting in motion a kind of hermeneutic circle, whose exit is the actualization of the same desire that originates and perpetuates it, namely, the desire to unify a voice and a body, speech and experience. The anonymity of the encapuchado

14 While Sarlo’s criticism focuses on testimonial literature, Wendy Brown’s essay “Freedom’s Silences” makes a remarkably similar argument in the ambit of political theory.
frustrates regimes of identification, just as the anonymity of the text’s author frustrates ‘representational’ modes of reading that want to assert the referential truth and moral hegemony of narrated experience. Anonymity also complicates the text’s mobilization of the *flaite* identity against the figure of the student and its movement. Despite this apparent goal, the fusion of the anonymous *encapuchado* with the nominated identity of the *flaite* constitutes an amphibious figure that operates within and in excess of the politics of representation and recognition, within and in excess of the text’s own representational matrix.

The student movement of the federations not only constitutes itself by denouncing the violence figured by the *encapuchado*. It also functions by obscuring the liminal class character of the *flaite*. Indeed, student movements gain in transversality by speaking on behalf of a figure that doubly cuts across class distinctions: first, by virtue of state-mandated universal education, which means that a vast majority of Chileans will at some time be interpellated as students, and, second, because education plays a key role in the liberal imagination as a meritocratic utopia that holds out the promise of class mobility. A student movement will be interpellated by the education system and its incumbent imaginary, even when its origins and goals fall beyond education, as is the case of 2011. In a certain sense, the student movement’s transversality is the obverse of the *encapuchado*’s anonymity; whereas the former claims a right to represent anyone interpellated by the state as a student, the latter ensures anyone’s right to eschew the logics of appearance, visibility, and identity called on in the act of hailing.

I do not want to suggest that Chile’s 2011 movement, mobilized as it was in large part by student federations packed with members from the Juventudes Comunistas (JJ.CC.), was unaware of the myriad intersections between class and the education system. On the contrary, its rallying cry, “Educación pública, gratuita y de calidad,” demands equal access to educational opportunities regardless of the social status or financial means of students and their families. And just as the 2011 movement is not one but many, so has the movement changed over time. Since 2011, it has broadened its indictment of Chilean neoliberalism. Most recently, student federations have spearheaded the ongoing mobilizations against Chile’s privatized pension system even as it continues to apply pressure to the educational reform taken up by the congress in 2014. My point is simply that the 2011 student movement gains force in proportion to its ability to present a united front. But its constitution *qua* student movement clouds its critique of the education system’s role in reproducing
class relations; its constitution qua student movement weakens solidarity between the struggle for free, quality, and public education and struggles against capital. The demand made of the state for better education remains a demand for access to the waged economy.

On my reading, the figure of the *encapuchado-flaite* interrogates precisely the (re)productivism that unites Chile’s student movement and dominant classes just as it frustrates their shared representational politics. The *encapuchado-flaite* casts into relief the successive figurations of the Chilean student, as the reproduction of the Chilean labor force has come to require specialized knowledge and skills acquired in the education system or at least credentialled by it. Disciplined, controlled, and now indebted, this figural accretion over the last half century indexes the transformation of the student’s reproductive labor for the nation-state into its reproductive labor for contemporary capitalism.

*Human Capital: Student-Investors, Student-Debtors*

I have claimed that the figure of the *encapuchado-flaite* affects a crisis of representation within a movement itself predicated on a crisis of Chile’s elitist, neoliberal democracy. Specifically, “En defensa de la capucha” does so by making the declassed identity of the *flaite* speak from behind the mask of the *encapuchado*. The paradoxical combination of a self-identified speaking subject (*flaite*) with a figure that refuses identification and individualization (*encapuchado*) calls into question the assumed reference that obtains between voices, bodies, and identities. It insists on the virtuality and potentiality of the mass within and against the movement’s representative political organization and its largely symbolic actions played out in the news media. Through the lens of this pamphlet we see how the specter of the mass, of direct action, and of violence haunts the movement just as the specter of class threatens to disintegrate the liberal imagination’s transversal figuration of the student.

Now, I would like to elaborate the claim that the *encapuchado-flaite* indexes the latent or repressed class character of the movement. To do so, I will decompose the figure of the student by tracing the history of it is representation and capture as a subject of late twentieth-century capitalism, first, as the student-investor and, then, as the student-debtor. In order to dislocate the figure from these representations, I will remit the student to his/her activity—namely, study. For, as we will see, it is the labor of study that must be measured in order to make the student reproduce capitalist society.
In his book *Derrumbe del modelo* (2012), social scientist Alberto Mayol claims that the 2011 student movement marks the reawakening of class struggle in Chile. One of the movement’s slogans, “No al lucro!” read narrowly, rejects Chile’s growing number of for-profit institutions of higher education. Read broadly, it indicts capitalism’s central tenet, the extraction of surplus value from labor. However, for Mayol, the student movement represents a “sophistication” of the older model of class struggle, since “el conflicto de clase histórico estaba ubicado en la dimensión del trabajo, pero el de la crisis de 2011 está ubicado en la dimensión del consumo, mejor dicho, en la obtención a través del consumo del trabajo futuro” (156). This notion of consuming in the present in order to produce in the future makes the class character of the student doubly latent.15 The first, ‘ideological’ latency arises from liberal democracy’s meritocratic myth, which casts higher education as a clearing ground of the class system, as a means for individuals to transgress the station of their birth. The second, ‘material’ latency arises from the view, often erroneous, that students are not yet productive members of society and therefore not yet properly classed.16 This double latency clouds a materialist analysis of the student and, by extension, student movements. In addition to the location of the student in the realm of consumption, difficulties arise from the specific reconfiguration of the student in the era of finance capital, first, as a human capital investor and, second, as an indentured servant in the global debt economy. I will argue that these figurations of the Chilean university student mark a shift in representational regimes latent in the 2011 movement that, along with the *encapuchado-flaite*, contribute to the representational crises the movement laid bare.

The transformation of the figure of the student into that of an investor in his or her own human capital has proved central to the legacy of the Chicago School of Economics, whose combination of monetarism and neoclassical economics informs much of Chile’s neoliberal governmentality. While the history of Chile’s Chicago Boys

---

15 Here, again, we are reminded of Clover’s understanding of riot as a struggle that takes place in the realm of consumption.

16 Many theorists of student debt, both its critics and proponents, overlook the fact that large shares of university students are simultaneously workers, and precarious ones at that. In his recent work on student debt, Maurizio Lazzarato seems to assume that the student is not also already a waged laborer. In *El ladrillo* (see below), the architects of Chile’s neoliberal counterrevolution assume the same when trying to account for the real costs that should be covered by student loans: “In effect, one cost of higher education not normally considered is the income that the student could receive if he worked and which we must forgo if he studies.” (147). As of 2013, one third of all students enrolled in Chilean institutions of higher education also worked (26 percent of university students, 31 percent of students at centros de formación técnica, and 47 percent of those at professional institutes) (“Jóvenes…,” 8).
is well known, less so is the impact of the Chicago School and related New Home Economics on the Chilean educational system. Beginning in the 1940s, Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, Milton Friedman, and Gary Becker theorized education as a service industry whose instructional product is consumed in order to increase the stock of human capital. The notion of education as human capital development was taken up in Chile almost as soon as it was invented. In a speech which set in motion the Educational Reform of 1965, president Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) claimed that low rates of education not only frustrated the practice of authentic democracy but also lowered productivity, since “la educación constituye una de las formas de capitalización de la riqueza de un país, expresada en los talentos del hombre” (qtd. in Ruiz Schneider 89). Jorge Gomez Millas, Frei’s Minister of Education, would add that, where once education was considered a luxury, it should now be seen as “consumption-investment” (Ruiz Schneider 89).

Both statements could just as easily have come from the mouth of Theodore Schultz during the course of a speech he delivered in March 1962 in Santiago. Schultz’s paper, “Education as a Source of Economic Growth,” documents the discursive shift at work in the transformation of education into human capital investment. Where today we speak of human, symbolic, cultural, and emotional capital without batting an eyelash, at the dawn of this moment of economics’ discursive expansion, which performatively inaugurated the next phase of primitive accumulation, Schultz still felt compelled to graphically mark the metaphorical transference of his vocabulary by underlining new key terms, placing them in quotation marks, or employing “as” in place of “is”. For example, Schultz states his purpose thus: “My principal task is to examine education. How much does education contribute to economic growth? What is the return of education? In answering these questions, I propose to treat schools (organized education) as an industry that produces instruction and that this instruction represents an investment in people” (7; emphasis in original). Before launching into his economic proof, Schultz feels obliged to forestall counterarguments founded on the “strong belief that the cultural attributes of education are beyond economies” (8). His justification for treating education as human capital investment rests on the logics of equivalency and commensurability which are axiomatic to his discipline: since education clearly has costs, which have

---

17 For a classic history of the Chicago Boys, see Valdés.
18 One notable exception is Raúl Rodríguez Freire’s essay “Notas sobre la inteligencia precaria (o sobre lo que los neoliberales llaman capital humano)”, in particular, 110-124.
long been calculated by governments that provide it, it follows that education has measurable returns (10). Schultz elides the “moral and value issue” that still inheres in the passage from the possibility of measure to its realization, the same issue that, in his opinion, for too long caused economists to “shy away from” the quantitative economic analysis of education (8).

The oversight, according to Schultz, is great, and its correction nothing short of revolutionary. The consensus among economists was once that economic growth derived from three sources: land, labor, and capital. Since land and labor were considered more or less constant, economic planning had focused on fixed capital. However, as the unexplained difference between macroeconomic input and output came into focus through quantitative analysis, economists—many cite Jacob Mincer as the first—began searching for other sources of growth to explain the discrepancy. Schultz mentions several contenders: the mobility of labor, more efficient resource allocation among regions and branches of a national economy, reduction of the “lag” between the discovery of economically useful knowledge and its application, economies of scale, advances in knowledge as expressed in fixed capital (already the topic of Marx’s now over-quoted “Fragment on Machines”), and finally the “rise in education of members of the labor force,” which an emboldened Schultz calls later in the paper “stock of education per worker” (5–7, 28). For Schultz, the last three sources—economies of scale and the stock of knowledge in fixed capital and variable capital—most likely account for the lion’s share of observed but unmeasured economic growth. Identifying and quantifying these sources marked a tremendous expansion of the purchase and power of Thomas Carlyle’s dismal science.

Despite the umbilical chord that for seventeen years (1956–1973) connected the Chicago School of Economics to the Pontificia Universidad Católica, and despite the receptiveness of Frei Montalva’s 1965 Education Reform to the notion of human capital, before the 1980s, one could have identified the Chilean university student as a member of the upper classes and the university system as a means of reproducing the ruling class and its ideology along the lines of Bourdieu and Passeron’s The Inheritors and Reproduction or Althusser’s On Reproduction. In other words the Chilean university student remained a subjected subject of a disciplinary society. Pinochet’s 1980–81 decrees laid the scene for the massification,\(^{19}\) privatization,\(^{20}\) and precaritization\(^{21}\) of

---

\(^{19}\) In 1981 tertiary educational attainment in Chile stood at 5.9 percent of the population age group 13 and older (Brunner and Catalán 55). By 2011, tertiary attainment in
Chilean higher education, all of which drastically transformed the social insertion and imagination of the university student.

Pinochet’s higher education reforms are rooted in the first-phase of the dictatorship (1975-1981), when brutal repression and state terrorism cleared the ground for the implantation of neoliberal policies. In 1992, the think tank Centro de Estudios Públicos published *El ladrillo. Bases de la economía política del gobierno militar en Chile*, which made public for the first time a 1973 working paper drafted by Sergio de Castro, Pablo Barahona, Sergio Undurraga Saavedra, Emilio Sanfuente, and other economists affiliated with the economics department at the Pontificia Universidad Católica. On the topic of higher education, the authors propose sweeping market-oriented reforms based the article of faith that “Los niveles superiores de educación—técnica y profesional—representan un beneficio directo y notorio para los que lo obtienen, de modo que no se justifica en absoluto la gratuidad de este tipo de educación” (146). Rather than a collective or even individual right, higher education represents an individual economic gain whose “real value” should determine its price (147). The argument against the state providing free higher education was the same in 1973 as it was in 2011: free higher education would not redistribute wealth since it equally subsidizes students from rich and poor backgrounds. Instead of universal state subsidy, *El ladrillo* proposes a system of both theoretical and professional training was 29.8 percent for the age group 25-65 (OECD 37).

---

20 Decreto con Fuerza de Ley (DFL) no. 1 (after passage of the 1980 constitution), declares the right to form private, non-profit universities. DFL no. 5 (1981) allows for the creation of professional institutes and DFL no. 24 (1981) allows for the creation of private technical training centers in order “to incentivize and stimulate the creation of private centers of this type and engage them in the delivery a good educational service.” While the laws appear to regulate, in fact these new norms shift the paradigm of higher education. Once an affair of state provided to citizens, education becomes a service provided to student-consumers by private enterprise.

21 At the institutional level, over the course of the eighties, public investment in higher education declined by 40 percent and universities were asked to make up for the shortfall through increasing tuition (Bernasconi 65). Institutions were made to compete for what subsidies the state did provide. At the same time, labor policy in the higher education sector was devolved to each institution. The result has been growing number of temporary, contracted professors so legion they have earned the popular moniker *profesor taxi*, a reference to their daily commute between the many universities where they teach in order to cobble together a living.

22 In fact, the document dates to 1969, when these same Católica-Chicago trained economists convened to draft socioeconomic policy for the right-wing presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri. Alessandri’s defeat by Salvador Allende made it so that the group would have to wait until after the golpe to pitch their free market-utopia to the now authoritarian Chilean government. (De Castro 7-8).

23 In his 1962 speech, Schultz made the same argument for more economically cogent reasons: “If education were free, people would consume it until they were satiated and
loans and grants to ensure individuals’ equal access to the higher education services, a process commonly referred to as focalización. On this plan, 70 to 80 percent of the costs of education would be funded by loans, and the remainder by grants to those students with the least resources. The repayment of loans would be directly tied to a percentage of future earnings. But lacking a mechanism for calculating present creditworthiness based on future income, this ratio suggests, contrary to the authors’ claims of equal opportunity, that the university would remain an institution largely accessible only to students currently deemed creditworthy, presumably from well-off families (148). Most nefarious of all, however, is the suggestion that, in order to change Chileans’ mentality about higher education from being a right to being a service, demand for credit should be artificially manufactured by immediately and substantially raising tuition (149). Unlike Schultz’s half-hearted attempt to address this shift in mentality by justifying it on economic grounds, El ladrillo demands that education is already a consumer good rather than a social right. It demands that young people be guaranteed access to the higher education market through loans backed by their future earnings. Both demands (from above) become compulsions (from below) with the manufacture of consumer demand for credit. First, the value of higher education and, then, the risk of human capital investment are individualized as the student is transformed into an investor.

But El ladrillo’s individualization of the gains and risks of human capital investment point to problems in the scale of its measure. For Schultz and Mincer, human capital functioned first at the level of a population (Adamson, “Human Capital Strategy” 273). Even the passage in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, where Mincer rediscovers the concept, conceives of human capital as “the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of a society” (282; my emphasis). Of course, human capital is embodied, whether in the form of knowledge, skills, affects, values, or health; its measurable output is the future productivity of the individual worker in the form of profit and earnings, as opposed to the intangible outputs Bourdieu calls symbolic and cultural capital and that Schulz recognizes but must exclude from the framework of his quantitative analysis. Individually embodied as it is, human capital is they would invest in themselves until the return to education were zero […] The costs of education to the individual are less as a rule than they are to the community (economy). If all costs were borne by the community (government), the individual would find it to his advantage to ‘invest’ in addition education until it would no longer increase his future earnings (to the zero return point).” (17-18). Milton Friedman and Gary Becker also insist that higher education must not be free of charge. Were education free, there would be no market, and the benefits of this service would remain unquantifiable and social.
not transferrable in the manner of fixed capital on which it is modeled, unless the laborer—and not just his labor—is treated as property. The “moral and value issue” elided in Schultz’s presentation in Santiago is not only the incalculability of the cultural, ethical, and political value of education, its symbolic and cultural capital. It is also the consequence of treating workers like machines or slaves. Ultimately, the debt relation becomes the mechanism by which the ‘free’ laboring substratum of human capital investment interiorizes capitalism’s capture and command.

By the 1990s, greater supply of higher education services and rising tuitions combined with the deepening penetration of consumer credit markets to compose the figure of the student-debtor. In order to transform Schultz’s macroeconomic and social approach to human capital investment into El ladrillo’s individual human capital investor, two issues must be overcome: first, the paucity of present income, let alone capital, among the young people who are most likely to become human capital investors and, second, the tremendous observed risk involved in investing in people. The first finds its solution in the financial system, as proposed by El ladrillo. The second however, presents a stumbling block to the first. Not only are young people poor in capital and earnings, they are poor in creditworthiness. Then, in one way or another, the risk of the student loan must be distributed, that is, socialized, even as its gains are privatized.

In his 1962 Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman proposed a novel way to distribute the risk of human capital investment. Based on the model used for other high-risk investments, namely “equity investment plus limited liability”, what has later been dubbed the ‘human capital contract’ would allow lenders “to ‘buy’ a share in an individual’s earnings” (87). Unlike loans, which are limited by time, interest rate, and rate of repayment, or even indentured servitude, which is limited by time alone, this contract constitutes an investment by the creditor in perpetuity.

---

24 The comparison of labor invested with human capital to slavery and machinery is not uncommon in the economic literature on human capital. See Adamson, “The Human Capital Strategy”.

25 In 1990, domestic credit provided by the financial sector as percent of GDP was 70 percent. By 2011, it was 109 percent of GDP. This statistic measures the depth of the banking sector and, in general, the degree of development of the financial sector. For comparison, the same measure for the same years in Argentina stood at 32 percent and 25 percent of GDP, and in Mexico at 37 percent and 45 percent of GDP (World Bank).

26 There is some ambiguity in Friedman’s text about whether the contract is limited or not. For example, he proposes that both “private financial institutions and non-profit institutions such as foundations and universities” should be the primary investors in human capital contracts (89). One can imagine that the incentives of for-profit and non-profit creditor-investors would be quite different and, therefore, that the negotiated percentage of
then, there are two investors: the creditor-turned-shareholder who fronts the capital, and the student-debtor and future bearer of that human capital stock who fronts the present, unwaged labor (sweat equity in the form of study) and a portion of his future, waged labor (earnings). The human capital contract is not, as Friedman says, just a way for the lender to “get back more than his initial investment from relatively successful individuals” in order to “compensate for the failure to recoup his original investment from the unsuccessful” as if investment were a zero sum game (88). The goal of investment is profit, such that “compensation” to the creditor-investor means dividing the student-debtor-investor’s return on investment. With shocking indifference, Friedman openly admits that such contracts “are economically equivalent to […] partial slavery” (88). Capitalism and Freedom would seem to lead down the Road to Serfdom.

Despite a recent revival of the idea of the human capital contract, in Chile, as in many countries, family incomes and bank loans remain the primary mechanisms for financing human capital investment. The latter takes the form of the government’s student loan program enacted in 2005, Crédito con Aval del Estado (CAE). The CAE was one of the 2011 movement’s key targets, but it remains central to the higher education reform bills making their way through the legislature. Under this scheme the Chilean government underwrites 90 percent of a student loan (principal plus interest) in case of default or desertion of study. This means that, in order for the Chilean student to become an individual investor in his own human capital, the state and ultimately taxpayers assume the risk of the student-debtor’s investment while the financial sector reaps profit in the form of interest.

future income and expected return on investment would differ. An equity investment means that the investor owns a part of the company until either he sells his share to a third party or else the company’s assets are liquidated and proceeds distributed to shareholders. The implications of this for an embodied investment like human capital are unclear. But beyond the term equity investment, Friedman does point to the enduring nature of the human capital contract when he says, “The individual would agree to pay […] in each future year a specified percentage of his earning in excess of a specified sum” (89; my emphasis).

In 2001, Vanderbilt University economist Miguel Palacios Lleras founded Lumni, Inc., a company that has used human capital contracts to mediate between institutional investors and students in the US, Peru, Mexico, Chile, the US and Palacios Llera’s native Colombia. For more on Palacios Lleras and the Human Capital Contract, see Adamson, “The Financialization of Student Life” (102-105).

In his interpretation of the Chilean Office of the Budget’s “Informe de Pasivos Contingentes”, Mayol notes that in 2009, the amount paid to creditors on behalf of student-debtors who deserted or defaulted on their loans was sufficient to having granted full scholarships to the same number of students (119).
What is the outcome of this system? Since the reforms of 1980-81, the number of Chileans holding a tertiary degree increased five fold, reaching nearly 30 percent of the adult population in 2007 (OECD 37). At the same time, Chilean institutions of higher education have been guaranteed the right to freely determine the cost of tuition (Brunner and Uribe 193). In the decade 1995-2005, tuition and fees across all tertiary institutions increased an average of 57 percent. And even as government funds during the period 1995-2007 increased 321 percent for scholarships and 448 percent for guaranteed loans (Mayol 119), in 2007 Chilean families and students still bore 84 percent of the cost of higher education (OECD 38). As of 2011, Chilean households spent on average 22.7 percent of their income at purchasing power parity on higher education, the highest relative cost in the world (Worldbank). And not only the price but also the quality of education was ‘regulated’ solely by the market until 2006, when the government enacted a ‘national system for quality assurance in higher education.’ Rather than assure the quality of education, this system assures the quality of the instructional product in order to maintain consumer confidence in the higher education market. At the same time, it gives incentive to that market’s further financialization by adding yet another measure to better calculate return on human capital investment.

Human capital and debt are technologies of control that produce the complimentary subjectivities of the student-investor and bearer of human capital stock and the student-debtor. Human capital encysts the property relation in the mind and body of the ‘free’ laborer; its power derives from ownership mediated by measurement. Debt modulates the conduct and way of life of that ‘free’ laborer, such that the debtor exercises over himself the creditor’s control. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, Maurizio Lazzarato has argued that this control functions not only through economic necessity and state enforcement but also through morality (10-11). Therefore, when human capital stock is purchased on credit, the creditor comes to own a part of the debtor’s living labor and to control aspects of his behavior for a period of time. As we have seen, the student-debtor is, in many cases, the material prerequisite for the figure of the student-investor, even though the notion of human capital is the discursive condition for this particular debt relation. As Lazzarato has it, credit “implies the molding and control of subjectivity such that ‘labor’ becomes indistinguishable from ‘work on the self’” (33). As such, the student-investor and student-debtor exemplify a larger shift recently identified by Argentinean social theorist Verónica Gago, a shift from ‘neoliberalism from above’ to
'neoliberalism from below' that marks the subjective internalization of neoliberal governmentality as a response to precarity (Razón, 12). And Lazzarato’s generalization of the debt relation to encompass the entirety of what he calls today’s “debt economy” makes the student-investor student-debtor dyad paradigmatic of contemporary economic subjectivities.

These various figurations do not supersede one another as if by some linear, segmented historical progression. Rather they accumulate and sediment, so that the student as present and future worker subsists. Writing about informal economies in Buenos Aires, Gago states, “Consumption as mediation and the financial as the figure of command put all the world to work without replacing the homogenous figure of labor. This diffusion of the imperative to self-entrepreneurship is exploited, promoting the invention of new forms of value production, beyond the confines of waged labor and the parameters of its legality” (“Financialization” 24). In the case of the student, I would like to suggest that its labor is neither new nor productive in any traditional sense. Beginning in the 1970s, Marxist feminism recognized reproductive labor as a source of unwaged and largely unregulated labor. Before it is an investment, the present labor of students is a form of unwaged reproductive labor (Federici), a fact often overlooked in the productivist paradigm shared by economistic analyses of education on both the political right and left 29. Human capital investment is measured by future, remunerated labor, and it is this measure that enables student debt. Although the student’s present, unremunerated, reproductive labor in the form of study yet escapes those measures, it remains impressed to reproduce labor for capital. If I have sought to transform Chile’s 2011 student movement into a student strike by returning the student to his/her future productive labor and present reproductive labor, it is only to leverage the power of the wage relation that indexes labor to capital. Ultimately, as Selma James and Mariarosa Dalla Costa put it in their manifesto for the Wages for Housework Campaign, “If our wageless work is the basis of our powerlessness […] then wages for that work […] alone will make it possible for us to reject that work” (3). In order to reject it now and in the future, we must conceive a study that is neither bound to reproduce the capitalist system nor to produce within it.

29 Oddly enough, Friedman’s extreme proposal for a human capital contract recognizes study as labor, although it misrecognizes it as productive by virtue of the same equity investment contract that makes it visible as labor in the first place.
Study-without-End

At the height of 2011, as tens and hundreds of thousands of students and fellow travellers took their demands for education reform to the streets, others had occupied approximately 600 schools and universities. Barricaded behind desks and chairs piled like caltrops in front of doors and gates, the occupations of schools and universities were direct actions that, like the encapuchados, operated below the movement’s representational logics. Unlike the encapuchados, the self-gestated high schools were easily enfolded into the movement qua student movement. But their mode of protest and will to autonomy pointed away from the movement’s productivist paradigm, in which the student figures capitalist futures, and toward the maintenance of the surplus population they already are. Even though the student occupiers stopped normal school operations, many did not also abandon study. In closing, I want to claim these temporary, autonomous schools as sites for the release of a study-without-end from its instrumentalization and expropriation, in other words, as sites for the enactment of a study useless for the purposes of capitalist production and reproduction.30

The digital publication Trazas de utopía collects the experiences of different actors involved in four self-gestated high schools during 2011. A collaboration among Colectivo Diatriba, Observatorio Chileno de Políticas Educativas (OPECH), the publisher Editorial Quimantú, and participants from the self-gestated schools, Liceo Eduardo de la Barra (Valparaíso), Liceo Luis Galecio Corvera A-90 (Santiago),31 Colegio República de Brasil D-159 (Concepción), and Liceo Manuel Barros Borgoño (Santiago), the text transcribes interviews with students, student organizers, teachers, parents, and other school workers who participated in the occupations.

The reasons students give for organizing the autonomous schools make up a collage that cannot be reduced to some gray theory. They range from emancipatory desires, liberal ideologies, strategy in support of the movement, and the pragmatics of

30 Fred Moten and Stefano Harney propose a similar understanding of study in their collection of essays, The Undercommons. Although their notion of study derives from a critique of academic labor preformed at universities, it quickly balloons to cover—or recover—the intellectual activity that animates sociality (110-13). Although study-without-end results from a similar movement of subtraction and affirmation, it shifts from Moten and Harney’s more productivist starting point, beginning instead from study as a form of socially necessary, reproductive labor. In so doing, study-without-end sidesteps the politically suspect distinction between material and immaterial labor that Moten and Harney must work to overcome.

31 Two short documentaries about the occupation of Liceo A-90 are available online. One interviews participating students, teachers, and parents. Another depicts a meeting between the students and David Harvey: see, “Liceo A-90” and “David Harvey.”
occupation. For Jean, a student at Liceo Auto-Gestionado Eduardo de la Barra “[[a experiencia de la autogestión, empieza por la necesidad del saber, de cultivarse como persona[…] de saber porque queremos, no porque tenemos que saberlo” (Colectivo Diatriba 10). Cristóbal Espinoza, a student at the Liceo Auto-Gestionado Luis Galecio Corvera A-90, the first of the self-gestated high schools, sees the practice as a way to shore up waning student support for the occupation, and cites as their inspiration the Argentinean self-gestated factory Zanón that students from the high school learned about at a student movement assembly (Colectivo Diatriba 42). For Miguel Legue, student at the Liceo Auto-Gestionado Manuel Barros Borgoño, self-gestion is a tactic “para tapar aquellas bocas que dicen que nosotros estamos haciendo esto sólo para capear clases y porque somos flojos” (Colectivo Diatriba 96). As one student simply states, “Con la autogestión demostramos que aquí venimos a estudiar” (Colectivo Diatriba 96). Whatever their motivations, students at the autonomous schools study by choice, a fact revealed when the state’s mandate that they attend school no longer obscures their will to study.

My interest in the occupations of secondary schools rather than universities has several motivations. Chief among them is the internal exclusion of secondary school students from the institutions of representational democracy: barred from voting, secondary students—the majority of them legal minors—are nonetheless mandated by the state to attend school. As such, their political discourse operates outside the channels of representational politics, similar to the encapuchado-flaite of the “Defensa”. Second, by concluding with the role of secondary students in 2011, we return that year’s mobilizations to their roots in the frustrated demands of the 2001 and 2006 secondary student protests. Viewed in this longer cycle of struggles, 2011 cannot be reduced to the demands about tertiary education made by university student federations. To focus on secondary school students at once dissolves the statist distinctions between levels of educational attainment and insists on the heterogeneous composition of the 2011 mobilizations. If the foregoing section has shown how the Chilean university student becomes a figure of capitalist futures through the financialization of study and its incumbent debt morality, this turn to secondary students necessitates the broader analytical paradigm of reproductive labor.

Reproductive labor subtends the divisive figuration of the movement. Recalling Clover, whether a struggle is over wages or prices, its cause and its goal is always social reproduction. Even so, the struggle for self-preservation marks the limit of productive, waged labor as an agent for change, for the reproduction of that labor
inevitably reproduces capital too. Beyond or behind the productivist paradigm, whether encapuchado-flaite, secondary or tertiary student, “the excluded and the indebted, they are the same global surplus” (Clover 155). My expansion of the 2011 movement beyond the figure of the university student parallels this class recomposition that expands the proletariat to include surplus populations, a proletariat no longer defined by its shared relation to capital but by its common dispossession. Study-without-end is but one name for the reproduction of that surplus that always and everywhere exceeds capitalist (re)production and its allied forms of state violence and political representation. And although the encapuchado-flaite seems to confirm Clover’s claim that “riot is the modality through which surplus is lived” (170; emphasis in original), Chile’s self-gestated high schools suggest an important corollary: that surplus can be survived through the institution of autonomous reproduction. In Clover’s thesis and my corollary, we find the oscillating poles of surplus: subtraction and affirmation, destitution and institution, riot and autonomy.

Even at the self-gestated schools, these two faces oscillated. As one student recognizes, study there was not all that different from study during the schools’ normal operations as apparatuses of state (Colectivo Diatriba 122). Students did not radically alter the curriculum, except for the addition of a few workshops taught by fellow students, even though they did determine the focus of each course. At the Liceo Auto-Gestionado Manuel Barros Borgoño, fourth year students even took the precaution of working with the curriculum that prepares them for the Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), the test that largely determines university admissions, should they have had to take it that year (Colectivo Diatriba 119). And with few exceptions, the autonomous schools preserved the student-teacher relationship, with university students filling in for those teachers who did not support the occupations.

From this perspective we could see self-gestation as the antipode of self-entrepreneurship or as a form of Gago’s neoliberalism from below. The situation is ambiguous in much the same manner as the encapuchado-flaite is amphibious. What appears as self-gestation or study-without-end in one moment may appear as self-entrepreneurship and study-as-means in the next, just as the encapuchado-flaite may at once appear as the illegitimate ideal of Chilean citizenship and as the masked face of surplus rebellion against neoliberalism. Ambiguity indexes the opportunism—in Gago’s terms, “la pragmática vitalista” (Razón, 24-25)—needed for constructing autonomous institutions within and against state and market institutions. And as amphibiousness is congenital to the virtuality of the encapuchado-flaite, so is ambiguity
indicative of these schools’ potentiality. Neither have any use for the politics of representation, recognition, and demand practiced by Chile’s the student federations and its neoliberal, democracy. Study-without-end names both a regulative ideal and the student’s basic activity immanent to an education system that instrumentalizes it as unwaged reproductive labor for capitalism. By subtracting their study from ends valorized by capital and policed by the state, students in Chile’s self-gestated high schools at once affirmed the autonomy of their socially reproductive labor and asserted surplus populations’ sufficiency unto themselves.

Works Cited


Capochnick, Michelle and Juan Cristóbal Villalobos. “Joaquín Lavín: ‘Los que marcharon no representan a todos los estudiantes.’” *La Tercera* (2 July 2011).


