Looking for Truths in a Constructed Archive: The Case of Jacinto López and the Politics of Accommodation in Rural Mexico

Gladys McCormick
Syracuse University

Many Latin American countries—Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, and Chile, to name a few of the notable cases—are reckoning with how to deal with painful legacies of repressive regimes left over from the twentieth century. Along with beginning legal action against perpetrators of political violence and setting up truth commissions to gather the testimony of victims, governments opened to the public the official files documenting and legitimizing this violence. In the Mexican case, these documents came primarily from the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate—DFS), the operative branch of the intelligence services from 1947 to 1985, whose files President Vicente Fox declassified in 2002 as part of an effort to make the government more transparent. The new administration failed to follow through on using them to prosecute some of the perpetrators of especially egregious instances of political violence, including the 1968 massacre of students on the eve of the Olympics.¹ Nevertheless, as has happened elsewhere in the region, these collections of documents—comprised of intelligence, police, and military

reports—have become new archives to be mined by scholars seeking answers to difficult questions that reveal just as much about the nature of state power as they do about the victims described on their pages. The dual and politicized nature of these documents has led scholars to question the meaning of the archives housing them and to recast them as, in Kirsten Weld's words, “units of analysis unto themselves rather than as a simple repository of historical source material.”  

Because these documents reveal the secret and brutal underbelly of what were supposed to be democratic institutions, they politicize all other historical sources they come in contact with, including oral testimonies.  

To echo Weld’s assertion, this more active and expansive definition of an archive leads us to see these collections as “sites of contemporary political struggle.”  

In this spirit, this article reflects on whether we can construct an archive out of material that includes declassified government files in tandem with other sources that they politicize.  

It does so by studying the heroic, tragic, and ambiguous tale of Jacinto López Moreno. He was a rural activist in northwest Mexico during the mid-twentieth century. He got his start under the tutelage of Lázaro Cárdenas during his foundational presidency (1934-1940), before leading some of the most famous invasions of large landed estates in the 1950s, including the American-owned Cananea in the northern state of Sonora. From an ideological perspective, he seemed committed to forging his own path, one that joined workers and peasants in a common project to improve Mexico for all and not wedded to the Communist Party, which at the time failed to reconcile these two groups in Mexico. Though he played an important role in challenging authoritarianism, Jacinto’s story risks being forgotten. This was surprising because a survey of DFS reports of rural areas in the 1950s shows that this Cold War surveillance apparatus paid more attention to him than to any other rural activist of the time.

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3 The usefulness of these sources has been amply deliberated elsewhere. See, for example, Tanalis Padilla and Louise Walker, “In the Archives: History and Politics,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 19, no. 1 (2013); Pablo Picatto, “Comments: How to Build a Perspective on the Recent Past,” ibid.; Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
4 Weld, Paper Cadavers, 3.
5 The idea of creating different forms of archives arose out of my reading of Michelle Caswell, Archiving the Unspeakable: Silence, Memory, and the Photographic Record in Cambodia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 50; Weld, Paper Cadavers.
While other activists languished in prison or were assassinated on orders from supporters of the dominant political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI), Jacinto appeared to have stepped back from his activism sometime in the 1960s. Why was he not rendered in heroic terms in the same way as other counter-hegemonic heroes of his time, such as Rubén Jaramillo, the peasant leader from Morelos and the so-called heir of Emiliano Zapata, or the formidable railway workers’ leader Demetrio Vallejo? Preliminary research suggested Jacinto was at least as active and effective as some of these other popular leaders at mounting an opposition movement during the 1950s. Questions remained about what happened to him during the following decade, which was precisely when popular groups radicalized and the governing regime more readily opted for repressive responses, which set in motion what would become a much bloodier phase in the making of modern Mexico. On the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the 1910 Mexican Revolution, political elites faced challenges from a wide array of sectors that called into question the regime’s monopoly over power. These included mobilizations from railroad and transportation workers, teachers, and peasant groups throughout the country that attempted, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, to join forces. At first, Jacinto appeared as a member of this movement’s leadership, but he soon dropped out of sight. As the DFS files revealed something happened to Jacinto in the summer of 1964 that forced him to reassess his radicalism and, instead, opt for accommodating to the PRI-led state. His story may in fact reveal important facts about the ways the governing regime coopted radical activists as it secured its authoritarian control of the country and dealt with popular challenges.

This article does not purport to be a biography of Jacinto López. Others, such as Miguel Ángel Grijalva Dávila, are taking on the much-needed task of exploring the impact of this radical rural activist in the mid-twentieth century. It is not a treatise on what happened to the left in Mexico with the onset of the Cold War or a reflection on the failures of agrarian and labor movements to mount an effective challenge to the authoritarian regime at one of its most vulnerable moments. Instead, what the following pages attempt to do is first, to understand why one of the key leaders of this particularly strong opposition movement is not remembered as a hero more than a half century later and, second, to explore how the DFS—without having

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to resort to brutal violence—reined in this especially threatening rural activist. The case of Jacinto López thus serves as an analytical vehicle to understand three related issues: how the secret police tracked activists and how it managed to curtail their activism without having to torture or assassinate them; how Jacinto has been depicted in the scant secondary material that addresses him; and how those close to him manage his heroic memory. The DFS materials, read alongside other polarized archives of information, act as a springboard for this line of questioning and provide a rationale for what may have happened in 1964 as well as for the vacuums of information that emerged in other sources, such as the reluctance of individuals to remember their time alongside Jacinto. The dilemma, revealed in the process of telling Jacinto’s story, is the key finding of this article because, as it concludes, not all stories can be untangled from their silences.

Creation of an Archive (Part 1): The Story of Jacinto López

The chronology of Jacinto’s life starts with his birth in 1906 in rural Sonora to a poor peasant family. He made it to the fourth grade and, even though he expressed interest in popular organizing, appeared on track to become a shoemaker. His fortunes changed with the arrival of Lázaro Cárdenas on the national political stage and the new president’s attention to consolidating his authority in the state of Sonora. As he did with many other activists throughout Mexico, including Rubén Jaramillo in Morelos, Cárdenas tapped Jacinto as part of a younger generation of up-and-coming leaders and nurtured his political ambitions. In return for their loyalty, these leaders served Cárdenas’s plans to circumvent regional political elites that threatened to undermine his national project. In 1936, Jacinto was the co-founder and first general secretary of Sonora’s branch of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (Confederation of Mexican Workers—CTM), the state-affiliated union representing Mexico’s workers. With the president’s blessing, he and Maximiliano “Machi” López led a popular movement that fought for agrarian reform in Sonora via land invasions. With the help of the president, they established the Unión de Sociedades Ejidales del Sur de Sonora (Union of Ejidal Societies of Southern Sonora),

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which would become one of the most successful and efficient collective rural organizations in the country.\(^8\)

Once Cárdenas left office, Jacinto’s ambitions grew to encompass a national agenda. Between 1940 and 1943, he was the federal deputy for Sonora for the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution—PRM), the precursor to the PRI. He hitched his fortunes to Vicente Lombardo Toledano, one of the CTM’s original founders who went on to become one of the most polemical opposition figures in midcentury politics. His political sensibilities lined up closely with Lombardo Toledano, ranging from his sympathy for leftist ideologies to what Barry Carr refers to as Lombardo Toledano’s “extreme, almost religious, nationalist fervor [that] was unusual on the left.”\(^9\) Jacinto deeply distrusted the United States’ presence in Mexico and sought to unify the popular classes in opposition to that presence.\(^10\) In 1947, he followed Lombardo in his departure from the CTM over the organization’s decision to support the more conservative and pro-American presidency of President Miguel Alemán. Jacinto was at his side when the radical leader founded the Partido Popular (Popular Party—PP), the socialist political party to compete with the PRI in the electoral arena. As Lombardo’s ally, Jacinto helped found the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico—UGOCM) in 1948 and was the organization’s secretary general until his death. Although the UGOCM joined an assortment of peasant and worker organizations to provide an independent alternative to the government-affiliated popular unions, it quickly came to represent primarily the interests of rural communities in the northwest, as well as in Veracruz, Michoacán, and Yucatán. Under the PP banner, Jacinto unsuccessfully ran for Sonora state governor in 1949 and again in 1955, and for state senator in 1952. As a member of the Partido Popular Socialista, he served as Sonora’s federal deputy from 1964 to


1967. He broke with Lombardo in 1967 and went on to establish the Partido Agrario Obrero Mexicano (Mexican Agrarian Worker Party—PAOM) in 1968. After a long, hard-fought battle with chronic asthma, he died in 1971 at the age of sixty-five.

Jacinto López makes a brief appearance in a number of well-known histories of Mexican rural activism and radical politics. References to him include his formative years in Sonora as an activist, deeply influenced by Lázaro Cárdenas and as a key player driving the expropriation of foreign-owned large-landed estates in the 1930s and again in the 1950s in northwestern Mexico. Jacinto also appears as part of a supporting cast of players in the rise of opposition politics after 1947, including the creation of UGOCM in 1948, the Movimiento para la Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement—MLN), and the PAOM in 1968. These accounts tend to limit Jacinto’s importance to the country’s northwest and focus on one or two key moments in his life, such as the 1958 invasion of Cananea, one of the country’s largest landed estates. They also present Jacinto as garnering his political capital from his alliance with Lombardo Toledano, considered to be one of the most outspoken and divisive opposition figures of the time.

Hubert C. de Grammont provides the most comprehensive of these narratives of Jacinto’s life in his study of the UGOCM. As with other narratives, de Grammont focuses on the 1950s as the heyday of the UGOCM and, by extension,
Jacinto’s impact on agrarian struggles in northwest Mexico. In telling the story of the organization’s place in Mexican history, de Grammont explores the contradiction built into the relationship between the UGOCM and the PP. The agrarian organization was born out of the political party in 1948 and had many leaders in common, including Vidal Díaz Muñoz and Félix Rubio.\(^\text{17}\) As head of the PP, Lombardo grew closer to the PRI throughout the 1950s in part because the ruling party believed he could keep the more radical elements of the UGOCM, including Jacinto, in line. As de Grammont writes, this tension ultimately undermined the UGOCM’s ability to act independently and contributed to the organization’s “long process of wearing down” across the 1960s.\(^\text{18}\)

The relationship between Jacinto and Lombardo is thus a key theme in de Grammont’s analysis of the UGOCM’s history. On the one hand, he condemns Lombardo as an opportunist seeking to improve his personal stature by accommodating to the PRI and facilitating the ruling party’s electoral control. The PP could have stood as an independent political party, but instead it helped shore up the PRI’s hegemony by reinforcing its democratic pretensions. On the other hand, he lauds Jacinto as an honest and ethical leader, genuinely committed to fighting against injustices and exploitation of rural peoples at the hands of entrenched political elites and foreign interests. In de Grammont’s narrative, Jacinto is the popular hero that could have saved rural Mexico and fulfilled the promises of the 1917 Constitution, had Lombardo not stalled Jacinto’s potential. For de Grammont, Jacinto represents a missed opportunity, an unfulfilled promise of what could have been had the rural leader managed to overcome the burden of his misplaced loyalty to Lombardo Toledano.

Reading de Grammont conjures up the biblical story of Cain and Abel. As brothers in arms, born out of the struggles of Lázaro Cárdenas’s revolutionary promises in the 1930s and a hatred of US imperialism, Jacinto was Abel to Lombardo’s Cain.\(^\text{19}\) For de Grammont, the relationship between Jacinto and Lombardo explains why the left failed in Mexico. In shutting down avenues of direct action and encouraging the practices of accommodation, leftist leaders became complicit in supporting the authoritarian state at a moment of its greatest vulnerability. By 1963, the moment had passed as the government, under the neo-

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 226.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 258. Unless specified otherwise, all translations are my own.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 225.
populist leadership of President Adolfo López Mateos, successfully divided and coopted members of radical opposition groups. As he narrates this story, however, de Grammont cannot adequately explain why it took until 1967 for Jacinto to renounce Lombardo’s accommodation to the ruling order. In this narrative, there is an earlier moment when Jacinto could easily have broken with Lombardo. In mid-1958, the PP and Lombardo established an electoral alliance with the PRI and its future president, Adolfo López Mateos. Lombardo even went so far as to publicly declare that the PRI fulfilled the 1910 Revolution’s goals. Once López Mateos assumed power later that year, Lombardo supported the new president’s rural reforms and thus undermined the UGOCM’s authority. Though Jacinto disagreed with Lombardo behind closed doors, he publicly continued to endorse the labor leader.

Why Jacinto was not more public in his opposition to Lombardo may have had to do with the violence he witnessed throughout the 1950s. In November 1953, “Machi” López, one of Jacinto’s closest allies in Sonora, was assassinated upon returning from Mexico City after submitting complaints about the abuses rural peoples suffered at the hands of the American owners of large landed estates in the region. In February 1958, the army descended on the community of Cuitaca to forcefully stop Jacinto and fellow supporters from invading the lands of the immense Greene Cattle Company’s Cananea estate. As Jacinto’s wife, Evangelina, remembered, the army “demolished the community and Cuitaca became a symbol of repression.” Evangelina also describes the bribery attempts and death threats Jacinto encountered while he was organizing land invasions in 1957-1958. Olga Pellicer de Brody and José Luis Reyna go further in depicting the widespread intimidation at the hands of government forces in April 1958. In response to simultaneous land invasions Jacinto coordinated in Baja California, Sinaloa, Sonora, Colima, and Nayarit, the military and police stepped in and rounded up land invaders, including women and children, taking them away in army trucks. The situation

20 Ibid., 231.
21 Ibid., 231-32.
22 Sanderson, _Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State_, 142.
26 Pellicer de Brody and Reyna, _Historia de la revolución mexicana_, 127.
escalated later that summer when Jacinto and five of other activists were imprisoned for six months on charges of social dissolution, meaning they posed a threat against the state’s internal security.27

This pattern of violence was a clear indicator of what the government was capable of doing when challenged.28 However, once López Mateos took office, he released Jacinto from prison and issued orders to break up the Cananea estate into seven collective ejidos (communally held land). These actions suggested a sea change in the government’s policies toward rural peoples and made direct action less appealing. It did not matter that the ejidos went into the hands of supporters of the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Federation—CNC), the government-affiliated peasant union, rather than those of the UGOCM, or that the ejidos’ finances suffered from the notorious mismanagement of the Banco de Crédito Ejidal (Ejidal Credit Bank).29 In early 1959, the breakup of Cananea represented a victory for Jacinto, though it required sacrifices he would never again repeat.

It would be easy to think that subsequent threats of violence dampened Jacinto’s radicalism. Yet, a more complicated answer emerges when we more fully consider what drove him first to direct action and later to accommodation. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Jacinto’s political ambitions had been repeatedly frustrated because he refused to support the ruling party’s agenda. He ran for office on numerous occasions and, despite evidence that he had won—such as in the 1952 race for senate representative for the state of Sonora and in the 1949 and 1955 races for state governor—he saw elections stolen by the PRI.30 He clearly believed in an electoral path for change; otherwise, he would not have run for office as often as he did, nor would he have supported the PP early on in its history. It is then not surprising that he would finally be successful in the 1964 election, especially as he had by then moved away from direct-action tactics.

If we focus on the late 1950s, Jacinto looks very much like one more in a long line of heroic activists fighting on behalf of rural peoples. Yet, that image becomes murky if we shift our gaze into the 1960s. It is at this point that even de Grammont runs out of answers to explain why Jacinto continued to support

28 For an overview of violence in rural Sonora across these decades, see Grijalva Dávila, “Jacinto López Moreno,” 171-78.
Lombardo Toledano, why he chose not to help his former allies in the newly formed Central Campesina Independiente (Independent Peasant Central—CCI), or why he left the radical path and accommodated to the PRI. By 1967, when Jacinto did denounce Lombardo and established the PAOM, it was much too late and he was much too ill from his chronic asthma to undo his earlier choices. He had also wasted the political capital he had won as an unsullied rural leader that turned into just another coopted rural leader who collaborated in the undoing of rural Mexico’s autonomy.

Aside from the academic versions of the activist’s life, there are others that circulate in the public sphere, including what are today two competing branches of the UGOCM. The split occurred in 1972 over the leadership’s inability to agree on the organization’s direction after Jacinto’s death the previous year. One branch continued to call itself the UGOCM and the other took the name of UGOCM–Jacinto López. This divide was further magnified later on when the former allied with the PRI and the latter with the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution—PRD), the leftist opposition party. Both branches lay claim to Jacinto’s memory in their formation and present themselves as legitimate representatives of his legacy. The UGOCM recently finished organizing and cataloging the Historical Archive of Jacinto López Moreno, a collection of documents on the organization’s history. The UGOCM–JL explains how the popular leader single-handedly revived the issue of agrarian reform in the 1950s and 1960s and showcases the leader as a success story for “citizens with popular initiative” to “demand the fulfillment of the law.” Both branches present Jacinto as calling on the fulfillment of the 1910 Mexican Revolution’s ideals and see him as belonging to a long lineage of revolutionary leaders fighting on behalf of el pueblo (the people). Accordingly, they portray Jacinto as a genuine hero with the moral mettle to confront parasitic foreigners, defend vulnerable communities, and act autonomously within a political order defined by rigid institutions.

The biography written by Jacinto’s brother-in-law, Humberto Ochoa Bustamante, with the help of his sister, Jacinto’s widow, seeks to establish the rural

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31 The UGOCM–JL split with the PRI in 2004.
32 It is now in the process of locating a permanent home of the collection, possibly in the already-overburdened National Archive. http://ugocm-historica.mx/biblioteca/uploads/docs/288e909a36f3a56a6874ef09a99ce82bb.pdf
It begins by describing the hardships Jacinto endured early on, from serious health ailments to poverty. It proceeds to map Jacinto’s political trajectory, focusing on the period between 1957 and 1959, when he leads the land invasion of Cananea and forces national political leaders—including two presidents—to reckon with the agrarian question. With the support of the thousands of people involved in the land invasion, Jacinto holds political leaders accountable for their many promises. As part of this defining period in the activist’s life, Ochoa Bustamante describes in detail the five months Jacinto spent at the jail in Cananea for his activism. The concluding chapter on Jacinto’s death is broken up across several sections transcribing condolence messages and containing subtitles such as “Funeral of the Honest Defender of the Poor.”

Ochoa Bustamante repeatedly reminds the reader that he was at Jacinto’s side throughout these key events. Because he witnessed firsthand the leader’s actions, he claims authority to speak on behalf of his legacy. He stresses in his own words or through the voices of others—including President López Mateos—that Jacinto was “the most honest leader this country has had in recent times.” According to Ochoa Bustamante, President Cárdenas declared that “women gave birth to men like him every hundred years.” The author includes “nice anecdotes” illustrating Jacinto’s honesty, such as his refusing bribes of millions of pesos from the American owners of Cananea Mining Company and government posts from President Miguel Alemán. Ochoa Bustamante juxtaposes these honesty tales with a description of Jacinto’s precarious financial position. Always behind on his bills and dependent on donations from others to feed his family, Jacinto was “a man who gave everything in exchange for nothing, just the satisfaction of helping others and feeling the appreciation of his people.”

Both versions of Jacinto’s life—the academic and the popular—portray him from a distance. They tell us about important dates, meetings, and events in his life,
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but only allow us to see Jacinto through the eyes of others. Scholars portray him as one of several players, more often than not overshadowed by them in the larger story of an organization, a political party, a land invasion, or a president’s agenda. In contrast to academics, the popular versions claim to focus on Jacinto to the exclusion of others. They use his memory in service of the present for two purposes: first, to add historical legitimacy to an organization lobbying on behalf of rural peoples beleaguered by large-scale agribusinesses or drug cartels; second, to remind others of their personal connection to a true Mexican hero. In both instances, Jacinto is this larger-than-life figure, incorruptible, determined, and the measure by which all Mexicans should be defined. They also stress his national reputation. Ochoa Bustamante, for example, spends considerable time documenting Jacinto’s travels throughout Mexico and his meetings with other opposition figures of the time, as well as presidents and ministers.42

What we do not hear from these varied versions of Jacinto’s life is what inspired him to become an activist, why he continued to support Lombardo Toledano despite clear differences of opinion, and what were his ideological foundations and relationships with other leftist groups, such as the Communist Party. Throughout his life he ardently promoted agrarian reform and ejido agriculture as well as the need for solidarity between workers and peasants. The invasion of large-landed estates owned by foreigners and the distribution of land to thousands of landless rural people reflected Jacinto’s long-standing commitment to direct action and his frustration with existing legal channels. Lastly, he advocated on behalf of several indigenous groups, such as the Mayo and the Yaqui peoples, who did not easily fit into the government-sanctioned categories of workers or peasants.

Those who try to explain Jacinto’s activism and his diverse commitments mostly knew him personally, belonged to his inner circle, and fought alongside him in the UGOCM. However, these are not the organization’s rank and file members, the landless peasants, the newly returned braceros (farmhands who temporarily worked in the United States during World War II), or the unemployed mine workers. What would those families who set up camps for weeks on end to help with land invasions in Cananea or the Yaqui Valley remember about the rural leader? What about the gambusinos—former copper mining workers seeking access to rivers on US-owned land to do placer mining—who joined the UGOCM? Estimates show that at various

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42 Ibid., 56-67.
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points the UGOCM had anywhere between two hundred thousand and seven hundred thousand members. Until the implementation of López Mateos’s neo-agrarian policies in 1959, these rural peoples felt that none of the state-affiliated unions represented them and so turned to the UGOCM and Jacinto to speak on their behalf. But they have left few of their recollections of Jacinto in the existing historical record. There may be other factors driving these silences. Because he dies from natural causes, he does not go into the history books as a martyr, which is what happened to Rubén Jaramillo after his brutal assassination, alongside most of his family, at the hands of government agents in May 1962. He only spends six months in prison for his political activities and, though he was repeatedly threatened, was never tortured, in contrast to Demetrio Vallejo, who had a long tenure as a political prisoner. The silences of Jacinto’s life are even more pronounced after he joined the bureaucratic order and accommodated to its demands in the 1960s. It is at this point that we turn to the DFS’s documents to fill out his story.

*Creation of an Archive (Part 2): The DFS’s Narrative of Jacinto*

There is barely a trace of Jacinto’s life after 1959 in the various archives housing material on individuals like him in the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico’s national archive. He makes a passing appearance in the files on the presidents and government agencies that he dealt with during his lifetime. There is no recognition of him in the Centro de Movimientos Obrero y Socialista (Worker and Socialist Movement Center) or other private archives that house files on leftist movements of the period. Several regional and national newspapers make mention of Jacinto. However, these periodicals are plagued by holes, including entire years of missing volumes, so it is difficult to build a narrative from newspapers. For this reason, the DFS files on Jacinto have immeasurable value in helping document his story, especially for the post-1958 period of his career as an activist. The documents themselves are inconsistent in quantity and quality, at times relying on rumor and hearsay, and riddled with Cold War rhetoric that obfuscates what was happening on the ground. Yet, they also provide verbatim transcripts of meetings, detailed accounts

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43 Ibid., 222, 227. Archivo General de la Nación-Dirección Federal de Seguridad Expediente 100-13-3 Legajo 1 Hoja 14-16.

44 Several of the DFS and Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS) files contain some of the most comprehensive collections of news clippings on the popular leader. See, for example, AGN-DFS Exp 32-1 Leg 34 and AGN-DGIPS G-2 Caja 1592 A.
of his movements, newspaper cutouts only found here, and surprisingly incisive analyses, depending on the agent writing the report. Above all, these documents are a source of invaluable information on both Jacinto López and the broader subjects of the governing regime’s coercive and Cold War surveillance apparatus during the 1950s and 1960s.

This apparatus gathered reports on the popular leader—some just a few lines, others multiple pages—beginning in 1953 and concluding on the day of his death in 1971. They document public and private meetings, telephone calls, land invasions, rallies, and trips across Mexico. They also assess the threat he posed to the political order. These threats included his potential for disrupting a presidential visit and the likelihood he would gather supporters on the campaign trail when he ran for public office, lend his support to a particular group of peasants asking for his help with a land invasion, and ally with other leftist leaders of the time. Jacinto features prominently on the list of activists that might disrupt President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Mexico in June 1962 and, as such, needed careful monitoring. Once López Mateos took office, agents reported the degree to which Jacinto might affect the president’s agrarian initiatives, including spearheading additional land invasions. Agents documented his actions in excruciating detail while on the campaign trail for himself or on behalf of others. They also kept close watch of his meetings with fellow popular leaders for fear they might coordinate a broader opposition to the regime. For example, agents carefully monitored his meetings with Demetrio Vallejo in the aftermath of Jacinto’s invasion of the Cananea estate. The reports are tinged with the threat of intervention. Depending on the official evaluation of the reported threat, the DFS director could call for corrective measures to diffuse it.

It is unclear whether or not Jacinto knew the scope of this government surveillance, which generated a range of documents, including intercepted letters and telegrams, recordings of meetings, and informant updates. These are covert reports, meaning they were gathered without Jacinto López’s consent. Several give an inkling that DFS agents relied on informants inside Jacinto’s inner circle. For instance, agents refer to Vicente Padilla Hernández, a close friend and fellow UGOCM leader, as an informant. The numerous verbatim transcripts of speeches in rallies and meetings

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46 AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 1 H 216.
48 For example, see AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 2 H 150.
suggest it was the norm for DFS agents to have recording devices at public events. As to who recorded the speeches, we can speculate it was informants themselves, journalists at the events, or agents passing off as journalists or audience members. In 1961 rally to UGOCM supporters in Guanajuato, Jacinto states: “There are journalists here in charge of recording our words. They shouldn’t get it wrong and not record what we are saying… [W]e are professional agitators and we will not rest until we put to an end the last landed estate in the republic.” Regardless of whether or not he knew he was being recorded or who was listening to him, the sheer number of these types of reports suggests it was standard DFS practice to record the public speeches of individuals such as Jacinto López.

All in all, the DFS reports allow us glimpses—both filtered and unfiltered—into Jacinto’s life. The unfiltered moments come through in the hundreds of transcripts of the leader’s speeches. The reports begin noting the title of the event, the size of the audience, and the names of key figures in attendance. They proceed to the speeches and conclude by noting the audience response and any ensuing action, such as contacting the president or forwarding salutary telegrams to fellow activists. Jacinto’s words at these events show the evolution of his public persona and how, depending on the event, he tailored his message to his followers in the fields of northwest Mexico, to opposition figures on the national stage, and in private meetings to strategize UGOCM actions.

We hear his logic in calling for land invasions in the late 1950s. We hear his genuine anger at the privileged position of foreigners in political and economic affairs and at the politicians who helped them. He called officials of the Ejidal Bank, for example, “political dogs of the Yankee bourgeoisie, of the great North American consortiums.” He goes on to decry that those “in service of Yankee imperialism [call him a communist] to scare people” from supporting his land invasion efforts. He repeatedly lays blame for the political system’s corruption on the former president Miguel Alemán. He claims to have exhausted all other avenues of redress to resolve the problems afflicting landless peasants and asks with frustration, “Can we just stand with our arms crossed before this panorama?” In the face of government foot dragging, he claims he has to take matters into his own hands to force the

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49 AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 1 H 367.
50 AGN-DFS Exp 100-16-3 L 1 H 14-16.
51 AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 1 H 368.
52 Ibid.
53 AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 Leg 1 H 369.
government to stand by the promises of the 1917 Constitution. International events weighed heavily in Jacinto’s public presentations. He often alluded to the Soviet Union and key moments in the Cold War. He frequently referred to the Cuban Revolution and called it an “example of a new path” for leftist groups.\textsuperscript{54} In his words, “Cuba is the guide for the Latin American peoples to emancipate themselves from the vices that for so many years have kept them in misery and exploitation.”\textsuperscript{55}

The filtered moments come through when DFS agents speculate on the activist’s motivations. Early on, agents viewed Jacinto López as nonthreatening. For example, one report states that, “despite being a Marxist, he is considered honest and looking out for peasants.”\textsuperscript{56} In later years, these same agents labeled him as a “professional agitator” and subjected him to greater scrutiny.\textsuperscript{57} Agents expressed surprise at Jacinto’s unflagging dedication to his constituents despite his health problems. Though he was under strict doctor’s orders to rest after a particularly bad lung illness, Jacinto continued to lobby on behalf of rural peoples from his bed.\textsuperscript{58} However, the files on Jacinto are missing many pages and, in lieu of the documents themselves, archivists include notes stipulating the pages were withheld for “national security” reasons. For example, the file stops at the end of June 1968 and resumes in January 1969, silencing Jacinto’s voice on the student mobilizations of that summer and their ensuing massacre in October at the hands of government agents.

The DFS reports show one last key facet in Jacinto’s life as an activist. His political tenor changed across the 1960s, with a decisive shift in 1964. He starts the decade as a radical leader rallying against the government’s inaction and threatening to take matters into his own hands. In a speech in Guanajuato in August 1961, he calls for “expelling all gringos” and had his audience shout “Long live communism!”\textsuperscript{59} In the opening months of 1964, Jacinto began coordinating the invasion of lands in Jalisco, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua. Yet, he stepped back from these invasions just as they were to begin, providing no reason for his change of heart.\textsuperscript{60} Having suddenly become a supporter of the political order, he was elected one of Sonora’s representatives to the Chamber of Deputies in 1964. Even his part in the creation of the PAOM in 1968 fits into the existing electoral paradigm of the time: The PAOM

\textsuperscript{54} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 1 H 324 and L 2 H 46.
\textsuperscript{55} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L2 H 23.
\textsuperscript{56} AGN-DFS Exp 100-23 L 1 H 430.
\textsuperscript{57} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 2 H 12.
\textsuperscript{58} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 1 H 266.
\textsuperscript{59} AGN-DFS Exp 100-9 L 1 H 5-6.
\textsuperscript{60} AGN-DFS Exp 100-23-3 L 1 H 22, 25, Exp 100-24-3 L 1 H 194-195.
did not threaten the PRI’s dominance because it further divided rural activists competing with each other to lobby on behalf of the countryside. In the aftermath of the student massacre of October 1968, Jacinto was quoted as saying that the “students had tendencies to the right” of the political spectrum, which conformed to the government’s justification for killing them.

Some of this change in tenor may be attributable to his rapidly declining health. DFS reports document growing health crises and longer absences from his political activities, so much so that by 1969 he is virtually bedridden with breathing problems. The change may also fit into divisions between opposition groups of the time. Across the 1960s, the DFS files track several attempts at establishing a coalition of opposition groups to challenge the CNC’s hegemony over rural Mexico, including the CCI. Jacinto’s loyalty to Toledano, who vehemently opposed the CCI because it undermined his own authority, stopped him from taking part in these efforts, which further marginalized Jacinto in activist circles. Lastly, the change in tenor may also have to do with Jacinto’s own growing closeness to government officials. He met with Gustavo Díaz Ordáz, president from 1964 to 1970, while he was on the campaign trail in April 1964. Later that summer, Jacinto met with Luis Echeverría on several occasions, first when that official was second-in-command and later when he was chief of the Secretaría de Gobernación (Ministry of Interior). Echeverría would become president from 1970 to 1976. The meetings with Echeverría have a cordial and friendly tone to them. Those with Díaz Ordáz do not and, aside from the handwritten notation ordering the meeting, lack any follow-up DFS reports documenting how they went. It is no coincidence that they fall within the parts of Jacinto’s file withheld for “national security” reasons.

As with many traditional archival documents, the DFS narrative of Jacinto López is frozen in time and held by the grip of the paper upon which the agent typed the words several decades ago. The narrative, however, is more than just these typed words and is subject to interpretation, depending on who chooses to decode the thousands of pages that comprise the files. What these reports contain is highly subjective and depends on the source. When an agent based his information on

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61 AGN-DFS Exp 100-24-3 L 2 H 394-395.
62 Ibid.
63 AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 2 H 46. For the DFS’s surveillance of Lombardo, see Iber, “Managing Mexico’s Cold War.”
64 AGN-DFS Exp 100-24 L 5 H 77.
65 AGN-DFS Exp 100-16-3 L 1 H 125-126.
rumor or hearsay, we are left to wonder what agendas may have been at play in producing information. Why would a comrade choose to pass along a specific tidbit of knowledge to an agent or take a recording device into a meeting? These files say much more about the agent or agency than about the individual or group under scrutiny. They cannot be read at face value because each passing page opens up questions that require careful deliberation and unforeseen avenues of inquiry. In the end, the DFS’s files leave the researcher uncertain whether her account might reify the government’s paranoid version of events, or, alternatively, reinforce a sentimental narrative in which the hero battles the evil Leviathan of an authoritarian regime.

Creation of an Archive (Part 3): El Líder’s Controlled Narrative of Jacinto

Considering the limitations of written sources, oral history might fill the many gaps in the history of peasant activism. But this is not the case for Jacinto López’s story. In the fall 2012 and after filing Human Subjects Protocols, my research assistant and I set out to locate individuals to interview. We soon met the secretary general of the UGOCM-JL, José Luis González Aguilera, though his staff never referred to him by name or his official title, preferring instead to call him El Líder (the Leader). González considers himself the gatekeeper of Jacinto’s legacy. Unfortunately, El Líder’s account of Jacinto López’s career turned out to be products of the moment and subject to constant reinterpretation, rendering them perhaps even more challenging than any DFS report on the peasant activist.

At our first meeting, El Líder billed himself as Jacinto’s “secretary,” which suggested the romantic image of Francisco Franco Salazar, Emiliano Zapata’s secretary, who harbored a rich cache of materials that provided documentary support for Jesús Sotelo Inclán’s majestic Raíz y razón de Zapata. After much prodding, however, the best El Líder could do was present a copy of Ochoa Bustamante’s biography. He explained it was an incomplete draft not suitable for public dissemination and described it as being written by a journalist who never finished what he promised to write about Jacinto López. He suggested he had other documents, but would show them to us at a later meeting.

He promised several in-depth interviews with not just himself but also Jacinto’s surviving daughter and others who had fought alongside the popular leader. Over the coming months, I grew to realize the futility of this promise of several

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66 Jesús Sotelo Inclán, Raíz y razón de Zapata (Mexico: Editorial Etnos, 1943), 203.
important interviews, as El Líder canceled one meeting after another. He repeatedly declined to be interviewed himself despite earlier assurances. Other possible interviewees demurred when we tried to formalize the interviews, because they wanted to make sure they had El Líder’s “visto bueno” (his approval). Several said that we had to interview El Líder first to make sure that whatever they told us fit in with his story of Jacinto.

El Líder takes very seriously his role as the central protagonist in the process of interpreting Jacinto’s story and is reluctant to cede control to others around him. Perhaps this reluctance is born from decades of experience managing Jacinto’s legacy and building so much of his political capital on his connection to the popular leader. As the months passed, El Líder’s deliberate silence and his silencing of others appeared intended to wear me down. I was unsure if he wanted me to go away or wanted to persuade me to abide by whatever narrative he eventually chose to give me without further questioning. After a while, I concluded it was the latter. As soon as I expressed a desire to end the process, he would come back with a tantalizing fact to pull me back in. Because the DFS files revealed that Jacinto met with activists in other countries, including Chile and possibly the USSR, I asked for more information about what happened while he was abroad. Whom did he meet with and what did they talk about? How much is this evidence of a transnational dialogue between activists of the time? El Líder not only confirmed these trips, but also said he had joined Jacinto on them and promised to tell me what transpired. However, he said, predictably, this conversation would have to wait until another time. This strategy of withholding the promise of an interview had taken on a life of its own. El Líder wanted me to see him as Jacinto’s embodied memory and respect whatever truth he chose to tell me. The waiting game felt like a test of whether or not I was worthy to receive and accept these truths.

It turns out that El Líder was just one of a small collective of individuals invested in preserving the heroic narrative of Jacinto’s place in Mexican history. This collective does not allow for the possibility of other versions of the same story, and it protects the authority of its members as the sole legitimate heirs to Jacinto’s legacy. In other words, this collective is attempting to fix and preserve their narrative of Jacinto in the same way the DFS agents did so with their typewriters several decades ago. They are attempting to form an archive that has the weight of truth behind it. From what I can tell, this collective is not privy to the information in the DFS files, which would destabilize their narrative, nor are they aware of the extent of surveillance on
the popular leader while he was alive. Like the DFS agents, their supervisors, and their informants, who sought collectively to assemble documents that legitimated their truth about Jacinto’s story, the custodians of the heroic version of Jacinto’s life neither knew of the alternative narrative nor could have made sense of it had they known.

In his insightful essay on gathering oral histories, Daniel James notes that if oral testimony is “a window on the subjective in history—the cultural, social, and ideological universe of historical actors—then it must be said that the view it affords is not so transparent that it simply reflects thoughts, feelings as they really were/are.”67 The dearth of other sources makes oral testimony even less reliable. Second, James reminds us of the “damage of insistence” and “the very real potential of symbolic violence” of pushing informants too far.68 There is a rationale for not doing so. They may in fact not know or remember much because the events in question happened four or five decades ago. They may want to conceal what they do know because of the repercussions such revelations could unleash. They opt to present a projection—a hollow image of a hollow story—because that is all that remains. Thus, pressing El Líder to testify more fully and precisely to Jacinto’s career, especially in regard to events of the summer of 1964, may do more harm than good.

Alessandro Portelli states that “oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.”69 Oral histories, with their inconsistencies, silences, errors, inventions, and all, testify to the meanings an individual attributes to an event. They are a dialogue as much with the present as with the past. Deliberate silence introduces even greater instability into oral histories, especially when referring to the select and edited testimony of individuals remembering events from over half a century ago. In the case of Jacinto’s interviewees, silence seemed designed to carefully nurture heroic narratives and conceal Jacinto’s accommodation to the authoritarian order. Similarly, the deliberate holes in the declassified secret police materials, supposedly meant to protect national security, served to impose a distinct version of Jacinto López’s life on historical memory.

68 Ibid., 135-36.
69 Portelli, Death of Luigi Trastulli, 50.
Taxonomy of a Possible Hero

The crucial turning point in Jacinto López’s career occurred after his 1964 meeting with Gustavo Díaz Ordáz, who at the time was Minister of Interior and dealt with national security concerns. This is the same president under whose tenure post-revolutionary political violence escalated to previously unknown levels and included the massacre of student protestors on the eve of the 1968 Olympics. In his meeting with Jacinto, Díaz Ordáz seems to have intimidated the activist to such an extent that the latter changed course and capitulated to the official line. The threat relayed in that meeting seems to have followed what Jacinto himself called “Jaramillo Law,” in reference to a rural popular leader from Morelos who was brutally assassinated in 1962.\textsuperscript{70} Several years ago, a former DFS agent explained to me that it was common practice, after calling an individual to his office, for the director of the DFS merely to slide a file across his desk. The unspoken threat, based on whatever incriminating information the file contained, usually pressured the subject to desist from his activism. This may have been the scenario Jacinto confronted in his meeting. The timing of this meeting may have merely coincided with his growing disillusionment at following a radical path after almost thirty years of struggle. Yet, it is telling that there are a series of long investigative DFS reports into Jacinto’s life between February and June 1964, detailing his political and personal history.\textsuperscript{71} The conclusion of the reports is part of the missing pages in the files. In any event, Jacinto walked away from his meeting with Díaz Ordáz and immediately changed course in his activism. Later that year, Jacinto was elected to the Chamber of Deputies representing the state of Sonora.

At this stage of my investigation, I cannot yet build a comprehensive archive detailing the complex life of Jacinto López. The materials presented so far capture moments in his life and showcase the challenges of being an activist at difficult junctures in modern Mexican history. Available records suggest the PRI-led state intimidated and/or coopted him. These sources suggest how the authoritarian regime dealt with activists without having to torture or kill them. Nevertheless, we do not have access to the precise details or the exact steps that led to Jacinto’s change of heart. Rather, available records show the rural leader through the eyes of others. On the one hand, the DFS agents and their informants are motivated by a paranoid desire

\textsuperscript{70} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 2 H 25.
\textsuperscript{71} AGN-DFS Exp 32-2 L 2 H 367-369, H 382 and Exp 100-24-3 L 1 H 194-195.
for power. On the other hand, those so close to the heroic rural leader hide as much as they reveal about his life and actions. In the end, we encounter Jacinto not as the protagonist in his own story, but as a ghost standing in shadows that deflect our inquiry. The narrative backbone is missing from this story. Those moments captured in the available documents cannot be threaded together to provide a reliable narrative that adequately includes the 1960s and does justice to the complexity of his life and memory.

If this archive cannot be built, the question then is what to do when a scattering of documentary sources, the DFS files, and interviews with El Líder are the best available sources to tell the story of Jacinto López. Perhaps this dilemma is the story. If no one chose to hunt for Jacinto in the archives, El Líder’s version would dominate. Conversely, if no one interviewed El Líder and his associates, the DFS documents would control interpretations of Jacinto López in the post-1958 period. It is possible that, as his admirers die off, and since few researchers will consult the DFS files, Jacinto may simply be relegated to oblivion. Passing mention of him in several monographs may keep his name alive for a very few scholars, but most will give up and move on to other, more accessible projects or ones that have a clear heroic ending. If this is the case, Jacinto, his actions, and his legacy will be mostly forgotten in a few decades, and we will have missed the opportunity to understand the difficult choices activists like him faced in a time of seemingly insurmountable odds. In the end, this story reads ironically like a conspiracy. On the one hand, the DFS has an interest in hiding Jacinto’s collaboration because it can use him as an unblemished and honest rural leader who came over to the government’s side as a matter of principle. On the other hand, his followers hide his possible capitulation because they are invested in depicting him as a faithful enemy of the authoritarian order—as a pure, unsullied rebel fighting until the very end against the governing regime’s abuses of rural peoples. It is ironic that those standing behind the official version collaborate with those invested in the heroic counter-narrative in what could be termed a conspiracy of silence over Jacinto’s cooptation.

Works Cited


