



Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall 2008, 347-361
www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente

Review/reseña

Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold. Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008.

Defrosting Contemporary Latin American History

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“With fifteen thousand pounds, a gratuity and a pension from the Circus,” thought the weary English spy Alec Leamas, “a man—as Control would say—can afford to come in from the cold.”¹ But as Leamas discovered, coming in from the cold would prove to be an expensive, harrowing, and, in his case, impossible venture. If the lure of a final faithful mission and a gratefully bestowed pension ultimately proved false for Leamas, what will it take for Latin America to afford to come in from the cold? The last quarter century has shown that the spreading of electoral

¹ David J.M. Cornwell [John Le Carré], *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964), 109.

regimes and economic liberalization have not sufficed to eradicate the legacies of Cold War political violence and state terror. Latin America remains a region of “recovering authoritarians” in which three out of every four people see their political institutions as providing unequal justice and substantial majorities distrust the holders of political and economic power.² Human rights movements have emphasized that a full recovery requires Latin America to come to grips with memory. *In from the Cold* goes one step further, contending that coming to grips with memory—coming in from the cold—obliges a deep historical reinterpretation of Latin America’s Cold War experience, a genuine “new encounter” with the “Latin American Cold War.”

Such an undertaking runs counter to the tenor of the times among those in the North Atlantic world who consider themselves owners of Cold War history. There, as Tony Judt emphasizes: “The twentieth century is hardly behind us, but already its quarrels and its dogmas, its ideals and its fear are slipping into the obscurity of mis-memory.”³ But in Latin America, competing “memory struggles” operate to stave off “oblivion” and to create different “ways of giving meaning to and drawing legitimacy from human experience” amid social conflicts that have not yet ended.⁴ In the words of Daniela Spenser’s conclusion to *In from the Cold*, “Standing Conventional Cold War History on Its Head,” the Cold War survives “in memories of a ravaged past—memories that fester in large part owing to the fact that many of the bosses of once-formidable security forces still enjoy a measure of immunity, notwithstanding efforts by victimized families to bring such perpetrators to justice” (394). Thomas S. Blanton, in “Recovering the

² Alison Brysk, “Recovering from State Terror: The Morning After in Latin America,” *Latin American Research Review* 38.1 (2003): 238-239; Corporación Latinobarómetro, *Informe Latinobarómetro 2007* (November 2007), 52, 91, 97, www.latinobarometro.org.

³ Tony Judt, *Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 2.

⁴ Steve J. Stern, *Remembering Pinochet’s Chile. On the Eve of London 1998*, The Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile, vol. 1 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), xxvi-xxvii.

Memory of the Cold War: Forensic History and Latin America,” demonstrates how truth commissions, personal testimonies, archival discoveries, and the activities of numerous organizations such as the National Security Archive provide a growing volume of primary source material in Latin America and the United States to support the project of bringing the Latin American Cold War in from the cold.

A formidable contrast exists between the influential character of Latin America’s Cold War experience and its scant presence in Cold War historical scholarship in the United States. Gilbert M. Joseph, opening *In from the Cold* with an extensive essay entitled “What We Now Know and Should Know. Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Studies,” emphasizes that “few periods in Latin America’s history have been as violent, turbulent, and, some would argue, transformative as the half century that ran roughly from the end of World War II to the mid-1990s and constituted the Latin American Cold War” (3, 5). Nevertheless, he argues that this Latin American Cold War has remained largely absent in the major historiographical debates over the global Cold War, a facet of the “mis-memory” of the twentieth century that echoes Gabriel García Márquez’s 1982 lament over Latin America’s “solitude.”⁵ A quick examination of *Cold War History*, the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, and *Diplomatic History* bears out Joseph’s claim that Latin America “remains disproportionately underrepresented in the journals specializing in the conflict” (10). Between 2000 and 2008, Latin American Cold War topics—mostly concerning Cuba—amounted to only about 4 percent of the articles in these three leading journals.⁶

⁵ Gabriel García Márquez, “The Solitude of Latin America,” 8 December 1982, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1982/marquez-lecture-e.html.

⁶ The content of a recent article surveying Cold War teaching and research programs in universities in the United States by implication suggests Latin America’s marginal position in Cold War scholarship: Hope M. Harrison, “Teaching and Scholarship on the Cold War in the United States,” *Cold War History* 8.2 (May 2008): 259-284.

Coming in from the historiographical cold, however, involves more than a greater inclusion of Latin America within Cold War scholarship. Joseph's essay offers a critical analysis of Cold War historiographical debates, one rich in bibliography that provides a particular focus upon the influential work of fellow Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis.⁷ Echoing Fred Halliday's complaint that conventional Cold War history has been too much "the history of states," Joseph argues for the need to go beyond the predominant concentration upon big power geopolitics and strategy by incorporating "cultural, gendered, ethno-racial, visual, and deconstructionist approaches to the study of empire and the Cold War" (18).⁸ By shifting their focus to the inner workings of Latin American societies, scholars can, in Joseph's view, construct "a framework for understanding the grassroots dynamics and meanings of the Latin American Cold War, one that would help us to better integrate the conflict's domestic and foreign dimensions" (19). The aim is not to supplant existing approaches, but rather to broaden, deepen, and engage. "In shifting the conceptual focus of the Latin American Cold War to the international struggle's 'periphery'—especially its grassroots—and to the intersection of culture and power," he notes, "we hope to constructively engage with mainstream diplomatic historians of the regional conflict" (18).

In from the Cold can thus be seen as component of a larger prospectus that Joseph, Spenser, and other historians offer to scholars willing to invest in a major project to reinterpret Latin American history since the mid-twentieth century. This new endeavor, as Spenser notes (381), shares Odd Arne Westad's provocative claim that "the most important aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor

⁷ For a trenchant review of Gaddis' latest book, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2006), see Judt, *Reappraisals*, 368-383. The review originally appeared in the *New York Review of Books* 53.5 (23 March 2006).

⁸ See Fred Halliday's foreword to Richard Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War. The State, Military Power, and Social Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), xii, where he emphasizes that "the diversity of factors underlying the rivalry of external powers is replicated in the complexity of the Cold War *within* states and societies."

Europe-centered, but connected to political and social development in the Third World . . . a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means.”⁹ Begun in 2000, the project garnered support from Yale University, the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, along with the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores de Antropología Social (CIESAS) and the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, both in Mexico City. A 2002 conference yielded a volume edited by Spenser, *Espejos de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe* (México: Miguel Angel Porrúa/CIESAS/Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2004), with essays by Joseph and Spenser along with several other scholars: Ariel Armony, Jürgen Buchenau, Adolfo Gilly, Piero Gleijeses, Friedrich Katz, Carlotta McAllister, Lorenzo Meyer, Richard Saull, and Eric Zolov. Containing some of the same essays and other new ones, *In from the Cold* constitutes an intermediate step forward in the efforts to widen the project’s geographical and topical coverage. A third volume, *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War*, edited by Joseph and Greg Grandin will include material on countries such as Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Peru not present in either of the first two volumes.

This ambitious and worthy enterprise builds upon the scholarship of recent years that has articulated new perspectives on the Latin American Cold War. In the early 1990s, Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough highlighted the importance of the Second World War and the immediate postwar years as a time of popular mobilization and democratic movements in Latin America that the consolidation of the Cold War after 1947 ultimately repressed.¹⁰ In a series of publications, Greg Grandin has continued this line of interpretation, forcefully asserting that

⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 396.

¹⁰ See Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and their ‘The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America’, in

at the risk of homogenizing diverse experiences, one could say that in nearly every Latin American nation the conflict that emerged in the immediate period after World War II between the promise of reform and efforts taken to contain that promise profoundly influenced the particular shape of Cold War politics in each country. To make the point even more crudely, in many countries the promise of a postwar social democratic nation was countered by the creation of a Cold War counterinsurgent terror state.

He further argues that “the Cold War in Latin America had less to do with geopolitical superpower conflict than it did with bitterly fought battles over citizenship rights, national inclusion, and economic justice.”¹¹ While superpower geopolitical rivalries may not merit Grandin’s hasty rhetorical dismissal (consider that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 may be the closest that the world has ever come to thermonuclear warfare), nevertheless, the implications of this new interpretive stance for Latin America’s twentieth and twenty-first-century history should merit serious attention from scholars for years to come.

In from the Cold’s dozen essays venture into several dimensions of this “new encounter with the Cold War” including a reworking of Cuba within the Cold War narrative. The two essays on Cuba that appear in *In from the Cold*—Spenser’s “The Caribbean Crisis: Catalyst for Soviet Projection in Latin America” and Piero Gleijeses’ “The View from Havana: Lessons from Cuba’s African Journey”—exhibit no foolish intention to jettison the entire apparatus of traditional Cold War scholarship.¹² The standard competition between the superpowers is present along with their

Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, 2nd. ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 299-316.

¹¹ Greg Grandin, ‘Off the Beach: The United States, Latin America, and the Cold War’, in *A Companion to Post-1945 America*, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 426. See also Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre. Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), as well as his *Empire’s Workshop. Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

¹² Gleijeses’ essay derives from his superb *Conflicting Missions. Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

efforts to manipulate Third World countries for strategic Cold War purposes. Both authors, however, put forth a more Cuba-centric interpretation of Cold War dynamics in the Americas and in Africa. Spenser sees Soviet officials as impressed by Cuba's ability to carry out rapid revolutionary change and to thwart U.S. opposition. The failure of Nikita Khrushchev's attempt to secure greater protection for Cuba and for the entire "socialist" bloc through the placement of missiles on the island caused the Soviets to reevaluate their previous opposition to armed struggle in order to repair their image as the "vanguard of international socialism, decolonialization, and the struggle for the emancipation of nations under Western imperialism . . ." Fearful that "Cuba would act independently of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere and would ally itself with the Chinese revolutionaries," the leadership of "the Soviet Union adopted a more conciliatory approach toward the Communist parties that chose armed combat, and gave its support to the Cuban political and military leadership, as well as to Cuban intelligence, which were training and advising the combatants in various Latin American countries in the 1960s" (77-78). Soviet assistance to armed struggle in Latin America remained sufficiently modest to avoid provoking the United States, however.

Gleijeses narrates the story of Cuban assistance to anti-colonial and revolutionary forces in Africa from Algeria in 1961 to the thwarting of South Africa's aims in Angola at Cuito Carnivale in 1988, finding that a mixture of realpolitik and revolutionary idealism motivated Cuban policies.¹³ He chastises historians who keep repeating—as does even Westad—that Cuba simply carried out Soviet foreign policy in Africa. "That Cuba acted independently and challenged Moscow in late 1975 turns established wisdom about the relationship between the superpowers and Third World countries on its head," Gleijeses emphasizes. "It may be hard to believe," he adds, "but it is supported by Cuban and U.S. documents that dovetail with remarkable precision and regularity" (124). He underscores the risks that

¹³ Gleijeses briefly mentions but does not discuss Cuban activity in the Horn of Africa.

Cuba took in defying Leonid Brezhnev in 1975-1976 and in undermining new possibilities for a *modus vivendi* with the United States. Gleijeses declares that he knows no “other country, in modern times, for which idealism has been such a key component of its foreign policy.” Cubans in Africa behaved, he states, “with a sense of respect that may be unique in the annals of nations dealing with dependent partners” (126).

While their views are no longer entirely novel among historians, Spenser and Gleijeses have offered well-grounded explanations in which an autonomous Cuba propelled international dynamics, discrediting earlier accounts that labeled it simply a proxy on behalf of Soviet expansionism in Latin America and Africa. If a more independent Cuban protagonism is one important dimension of “Latin America’s new encounter with the Cold War,” so logically is a greater capacity for autonomous action by other Latin American states, a point strongly emphasized by Ariel C. Armony in “Transnationalizing the Dirty War. Argentina in Central America.” Armony tracks the intervention of the Argentine military in Central America from 1977 to 1984 through the provision of assistance, first to Somoza, and then to the Contra as well as to the militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Victorious veterans of the domestic Argentine Dirty War saw themselves as crusaders in a global anti-Communist struggle and erroneously assumed that their cooperation with the U.S. in Central America would secure North American acquiescence in their seizure of the Malvinas from Great Britain in 1982.

Armony uses this case to argue that the Cold War was not “imposed” on Latin American countries, “essentially because they responded to local and regional socioeconomic and political dislocations, and their own actions, often independent from those of the superpowers, shaped the nature and pace of the Cold War” (157). Certainly Latin Americans had their “own style of anti-Communism . . . that played a pivotal role in the conflicts of the Cold War in Latin America” (158). One only needs to recall the grotesque geopolitical imaginings of Argentine

military leaders in their interrogations and torture of Jacobo Timerman or the brutal philosophy of Brazilian General Golbery do Couto e Silva who envisioned a “total war” in which “no distinction is made between soldiers and civilians, men, women, and children; they face the same danger, and identical sacrifices are demanded of them. They must all abdicate the secular liberties . . . and place them in the hands of the state, the all-powerful lord of war. . .¹⁴ Certainly, as Armony shows, the Argentine military made use of transnational anti-Communist networks of state and non-state actors not controlled by the United States. Certainly, as well, “decentering” the Latin American Cold War as part of a “multipolar and multifocal confrontation that we are still unraveling” (159) suits an early twenty-first century “post-American” world characterized by a weakening U.S. hegemony and a “rise of the rest.”¹⁵ And certainly *In from the Cold* wisely replaces the “era of the Cuban Revolution” in which the U.S.-Cuban conflict “dictated the broad sweep” of Latin American politics for three decades with a longer Latin American Cold War whose deep roots lie within a diverse set of societies themselves.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the project of “Latin Americanizing the Cold War” needs to avoid overstatement, the classic danger to which all efforts at historical revisionism remain vulnerable. Considering the rise of national security state regimes in the Southern Cone or the counter-insurgency wars in Central America, it would be hard to agree with Armony that the United States merely “played an influential role in the battles waged in [Cold War] Latin America” and should *not* be considered “the leading external actor in regional conflicts” (157). Stephen J. Bachelor’s essay “Miracle on Ice. Industrial Workers and the Promise of Americanization in Cold War

¹⁴ See Jacobo Timerman, *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*, trans. Toby Talbot (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 73-74 and 101-102; General Golbery do Couto e Silva quoted in Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 15.

¹⁵ See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: Norton, 2008).

¹⁶ Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, rev. ed. (Westport and London: Praeger, 2001), xiii.

Mexico,” also succumbs to overstatement. Echoing an earlier 2001 essay, Bachelor looks at the Mexican auto plants of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler.¹⁷ His argument remains on solid ground when contending that Mexican “working people fashioned a popular, democratic movement, born in the promise of the American dream . . . that threatened both official conceptions of Mexican citizenship and key facets of U.S. imperial rule in Mexico,” leading to violence and repression (255). But he overreaches when he makes the labor repression after 1969 “a fundamental turning point in Mexico and the United States’ postwar political economy” that ultimately led to neoliberalism, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and “the Cold War’s most enduring legacy in Mexico: the triumph, over widespread opposition, of an economic model based on fluid finance capital, deterritorialized markets, and flexible modes of accumulation” (256).¹⁸ This seems an excessively reductionist view that oversimplifies both the relationship of import-substitution industrialization to the Cold War and the complex array of causes behind Mexico’s adoption of economic reform after 1982, including its entry into NAFTA.

These difficulties suggest the need for great clarity in executing the revisionist project of “Latin Americanizing the Cold War.” A distinction needs to be made between the Cold War and the Cold War era. Not all events that took place between 1946 and 1990—the Cold War era—form part of Cold War history, something important to remember when raising

¹⁷ See Steven J. Bachelor, “Toiling for the ‘New Invaders’: Autoworkers, Transnational Corporations, and Working-Class Culture in Mexico City, 1955-1968,” in *Fragments of a Golden Age. The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 273-326.

¹⁸ Bachelor, p. 256, citing an issue of the *Diario Oficial* from 1962, mistakenly states that “Between 1949 and 1955, the country’s gross domestic product grew by a staggering 18 percent. Between 1955 and 1959, however, that figure grew by only 7 percent.” Mexico’s real GDP expanded during those two periods by 47 and 25 percent respectively, figures upon which two authoritative sources agree: Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992* (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995), p. 189; and, drawing from a Banco de México publication, Héctor Aguilar Camín and Lorenzo Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1989*, trans. Luis Alberto Fierro (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 172.

the historical profile of social and cultural matters in “Latin Americanizing the Cold War.” New historical scholarship should use the Latin American Cold War to revise the broad historical narrative of the Cold War and its “great debates,” a task requiring demonstrating, as the articles of Armony, Gleijeses, Joseph, and Spenser do, how Latin American questions influenced the global competition between the superpowers and established south-south patterns of transnational interaction. Future scholarship should also endeavor, as the remaining articles from *In from the Cold* do, to delineate quite closely how internal Latin American social and cultural processes involved the ideological issues of the Latin American Cold War and shaped its conflicts.

Coming in from the historiographical Cold will mean bringing in countries like Mexico whose scant treatment in Cold War studies Joseph finds “astonishing” (8). As one Mexican scholar has recently contended, the long-term disruptive effects of the Cold War on Mexico were “distinct, but no less significant than those that took place in other Latin American countries.”¹⁹ Aside from Bachelor’s contribution, *In from the Cold* contains three essays on Mexicans and the Cold War, all of which underscore the importance of the social and cultural issues that the “new encounter” seeks to elucidate. In “Producing the Cold War in Mexico. The Public Limits of Covert Communications,” Seth Fein examines Project Pedro, an unsuccessful 1956-1962 USIA operation aimed at producing favorable local news coverage for the United States. Using an expatriate U.S. executive, elite Mexican “prestanombres,” and a dummy front corporation, Project

¹⁹ Soledad Loaeza, ‘Gustavo Díaz Ordaz: el colapso del *milagro mexicano*’, in *Una historia contemporánea de México, Vol. 2, Actores*, ed. Ilán Bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer (México: Editorial Océano de México, 2005), 154. See also Arthur Schmidt, “The Political and Economic Reverberations of the Cuban Revolution in Mexico,” *History Compass* 6.4 (July 2008): 1140-1163. Jefferson Morley describes the close relationship between Winston Scott, CIA station chief in Mexico City 1956-1969, and the highest Mexican officials. Among those receiving stipends from the CIA were two presidents, Adolfo López Mateos and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, one future president, Luis Echeverría Álvarez, and secret police powerhouse Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios: *Our Man in Mexico. Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008).

Pedro sought to shape the content of Mexican cinema newsreels, but ultimately found its aims frustrated by the expectations of local audiences, Mexican government censorship, and U.S. embassy alarm over the project's costs. In Fein's view, Project Pedro illustrates the limits of U.S. power in the Cold War, particularly "the dissonance between imperial institutions and social power on the ground." Project Pedro became a case of "cultural empire without cultural imperialism" in a context in which "the broader field of Mexican mass culture ultimately determined not only the newsreels' audiovisual production but also the production of their meanings, of their public consumption" (203). In short, local ways could overpower the instruments of the superpower grand strategy that has occupied so much of the Cold War historiography. "International history must be placed in a transnational frame," Fein concludes, "one that, in Project Pedro's case, views the history of Mexico as part of the history of the United States and the history of the United States as part of Mexico" (205).

The essays of Eric Zolov and Stephen Pitti operate within this "transnational frame" of the interpenetration of United States and Mexican history. Zolov's "¡Cuba sí, Yanquis no! The Sacking of the Instituto Cultural México-Norteamericano in Morelia, Michoacán, 1961" indicates the importance of Mexican national politics even in a Cold War event so important to the superpowers and to Cuba as the April, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. In the midst of the growing hostilities between the United States and the government of Fidel Castro after 1959, former Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas rallied a mushrooming agglomeration of political forces in support of Cuba that reflected the "mounting social and ideological tensions brewing within Mexican society." After protesters sacked the U.S. cultural institute in Morelia following the Bay of Pigs, Mexican officials deftly played the anti-Communist card with the United States, but in reality, Zolov argues, "for the Mexican government what was at stake was the containment not of Communism but of cardenismo [*sic*]" (215) At the ideological level the Cold War operated as a polarized dichotomy, making

the Institute a symbol of U.S. imperial aggression, but locally ambiguities could also thrive, even in Michoacán, “the cradle of Cardenismo,” especially where cultural perceptions of modernity and social mobility came into play. The public may have felt little sympathy with the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Cuba, but “the majority of residents in Morelia wanted *their* [italics added] institute back” (241).

Pitti’s “Chicano Cold Warriors. César Chávez, Mexican American Politics, and California Farmworkers” smoothly brings the “transnational frame” within the physical boundaries of the United States, looking at Mexican immigrant and Mexican American politics in California from the late 1940s until 1970. Highlighting César Chávez, the formation of the United Farm Workers, and the famous Delano grape strike, Pitti shows how Latino social activism consistently remained concerned that Cold War issues might undermine the legitimacy of its struggle. “U.S. military involvement in Korea and Vietnam, and church-based religious activism, gave shape to many Latino political struggles, and many Mexican and Mexican American participants worried that Soviet interests might influence domestic developments in the rural United States.” Cold war fears, Pitti finds, could work in contradictory ways. They “predictably served to legitimize antilabor, and often racist, attempts to block Mexican and Mexican American political advancement during the 1950s and 1960s, but they also inspired anti-Communist attempts to grapple with rural poverty” (274). Ultimately, Cold War anti-Communism acted more as an enabling than a repressive force in the historical trajectory of the UFW. By the mid-1960s, the Chicano movement “visually evoked Che and Castro without linking the farmworkers to those Communist icons” (283). Chávez’s followers marched under the banner of powerful Mexican Catholic symbols such as the Virgin of Guadalupe. Cultural nationalism and nonviolent tactics became strong defining elements, allowing the movement to affiliate more closely with civil rights, student, and antiwar groups without falling victim to Cold War anti-Communism. By the end of

1968, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee could safely go beyond its earlier “muted critiques of the U.S. role in Vietnam” and at the same time ally with liberal Democrats, shying away from “Third World internationalists”(290, 293). Creative tactics and artful positioning within the domestic Cold War ideological conflicts brought a major victory in 1970 that gave the union a contract covering 85 percent of California’s grapes, but they could not guarantee a smooth future for the UFW. Nevertheless, its “reputation as a thoroughly American and anti-Communist outfit” has remained an asset in its efforts to help “shape Latino futures in the United States” (299, 301).

The two essays of Victoria Langland and Carlota McAllister—“Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails. Reading Sex and Revolution in 1968 Brazil” and “Rural Markets, Revolutionary Souls, and Rebellious Women in Cold War Guatemala”—stress the Cold War as a lived experience that transformed social relations. Tracing the rise of student movements and an armed underground in Brazil in 1968, Langland finds that “young men and women provoked considerable public discussion both through their increasing use of violent tactics and through their challenging of sexual boundaries” (311). Magazine and advertising representations of “armed, alluring women,” some of them influenced by the film *Bonnie and Clyde*, revealed Brazil’s mixture of social and political anxieties that youthful female activism provoked. Langland argues that such representations amounted to an attempt “not only to limit oppositional political activism itself but also to shut down the very political identities that allowed for such activism” (310). They encouraged more vicious treatment of female political prisoners and contributed to the severe military crackdown of Institutional Act No. 5 in late 1968.

McAllister shows how U.S. economic development theory, exemplified by Walt Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth*, intended to bring rural populations safely into the modernity of the market and insulate them from the potential appeal of Communism. In the real world economy

of the Mayan village of Chupol, however, changes in transport infrastructure and the promotion of indigenous rights by Catholic clergy brought increased political consciousness and a mushrooming of local organization in the form of membership in the Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC). In a “forceful repudiation of the Guatemalan state’s incursions into indigenous communities,” Chupol women “wielding large sticks and torches” chased away army troops who had come to the weekly market to coerce young men into military service. Creating an ironical reversal, the “matrix of Chupol’s market transformed Cold War anti-Communism into Cold War revolutionary action” (350, 371).

Toward the end of the film version of *The Spy That Came in from the Cold*, Claire Bloom, in shock that her world view had been upended, asks Richard Burton (playing the part of Alec Leamas), “How can you turn the world upside down?”²⁰ By “standing conventional Cold War history on its head,” the essays in *In from the Cold* have provided an initial response to that question. Over the next several years, this ambitious project will require extensive further research and innumerable studies of individual cases. Only then will the basis exist for an historical synthesis of the Latin American Cold War as a more conclusive answer.

²⁰ Martin Ritt, *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1965).